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This thesis investigates the links between stress, Theory of Mind (ToM) and 
emotional and behavioural difficulties in children.
Part 1  reviews the literature on individual differences in ToM in relation to emotional 
and behavioural difficulties, considering peer relationships, attention, behaviour, 
bullying and internalising difficulties.
Part 2 is the report of an empirical study investigating the effect of social stress on 
ToM. A group of 9 - 11 year old children were exposed to either the Trier Social 
Stress Test for Children (TSST-C; Buske-Kirschbaum et al., 1997) or a control 
condition prior to completing two ToM tasks. Physiological stress reactivity was 
measured by determination of salivary cortisol at two time points. The two groups 
did not differ in salivary cortisol levels and a group difference in ToM performance 
was not found.  However, in the stressed group, an association was found between a 
measure of salivary cortisol post stressor and performance on one of the ToM tasks. 
The study also investigated associations of stress physiology and ToM with 
emotional and behavioural difficulties, however, these were not found. The results 
are discussed with reference to the limitations of the study. This was part of a joint 
project with James Fairbaim, Trainee Clinical Psychologist (‘Stress, cortisol and 
executive functioning in pre-adolescent school children ).
Part 3 is a critical appraisal of this thesis. This includes research and clinical 
implications of the empirical study and a personal reflection of the research process. 
The appraisal ends with a brief summary of the thesis.
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6PARTI
LITERATURE REVIEW
IS THERE EVIDENCE THAT INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN 
THEORY OF MIND RELATE TO EMOTIONAL AND 
BEHAVIOURAL DIFFICULTIES IN CHILDREN?
7Abstract
This review focuses on the nature of individual differences in Theory of Mind (ToM) 
and examines evidence concerning the links between ToM and children’s emotional 
and behavioural problems. An introduction to ToM is given, followed by a brief 
synopsis of what is known about the influences on individual differences in ToM. 
The review considers ToM in relation to peer rejection, attention and behavioural 
difficulties, bullying and emotional difficulties. Research in these areas is in its 
infancy and the review describes the difficulties intrinsic to this type of research (for 
example, measuring ToM) as well as drawing the reader to the importance and 
potential implications of ToM research in child development and the development of 
psychological difficulties. Ideas for further research are proposed.
8Introduction to Theory of Mind
‘Theory of mind’ (ToM) or ‘mentalization’ are terms used to describe the ability to 
predict and explain others’ behaviour with reference to mental states. In other words, 
it is the capacity to hypothesise about another person’s thoughts or beliefs, with the 
recognition that they may be the same or different to one’s own. Classically, the 
false-belief paradigm is used to demonstrate if a participant has a ToM and is often 
referred to as the ‘litmus test’ for ToM. False-belief tasks require the participant to 
predict another’s behaviour when something unexpected happens (e.g. a change in 
location of an object) by referring to the other’s false belief. A classic example is the 
Sally-Ann task (Baron-Cohen, 1985), in which Sally puts her ball in a basket and 
leaves the room, in her absence Ann moves the ball to a box and the participant then 
has to say where Sally will look for the ball when she returns.
Typically, the acquisition of ToM is experimentally observed in 4 year old children 
who begin to pass false-belief tasks. Research has been carried out investigating 
ToM acquisition and development in both typical and atypical development. For 
example, a multitude of ToM research over the past twenty years has focused on 
individuals with autism who are shown to exhibit impaired ToM skills. With the 
development of new, more advanced ToM tasks, research is moving away from 
considering ToM as something which is present or absent, towards individual 
differences in ToM. Some research on individual differences has been carried out 
with different adult clinical populations, for example those with schizophrenia (e.g. 
Langdon & Coltheart, 1999), borderline personality disorder (e.g. Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2004) and those known to be sex offenders (e.g. Keenan & Ward, 2000).
9Other research has examined associations between ToM and functioning within the 
normal range both in adults and children.
This literature review focuses upon individual differences in ToM and relationships 
to emotional or behavioural problems in childhood, considering peer rejection (and 
popularity), attention and behaviour difficulties, bullying and emotional difficulties. 
The reviewed literature was gained from searches cross matching ‘Theory of Mind’ 
or ‘Mentalization’ with many different terms using ‘Psychlnfo’ and ‘Web of 
Science’. The literature will be reviewed in terms of the quality of the research 
carried out and tentative conclusions will be drawn from the research to date. The 
review does not include literature on ToM in relation to children with autism (see 
Baron-Cohen, 2000 for a review), those who are deaf (see Peterson, 2003) and those 
with acquired brain injury (e.g. Snodgrass & Knott, 2006). The study of ToM in 
these groups of children is informative for typical development and some of the 
difficulties these populations face highlight the importance of ToM in the social 
worlds of children, however it is outside the scope of this review to consider this 
research.
Prior to examining studies on the association between ToM and children’s 
functioning, sources of influence on individual differences are briefly reviewed.
Influences on Individual Differences in ToM
Social communication is seen in normally developing infants from birth through their 
efforts to interact with people and to impel others to interact with them. Behaviours 
such as engagement in joint visual attention, social referencing and pretend play are
10all thought to be milestones in ToM development. There is evidence to suggest that 
both genetic and environmental factors effect ToM development and this will be 
reviewed in brief here (see Hughes & Leekham, 2004 for a more in-depth review).
Genetic influence
A genetic influence on ToM development is suggested by evidence that children with 
autism, a highly heritable disorder, often perform poorly on tests of ToM. Several 
theoretical accounts highlighting the innate nature of early ToM development have 
been proposed (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995). In order to investigate this hypothesis, 
Hughes and colleagues used twin studies, comparing monozygotic and dizygotic 
twins. They gave a battery of ToM tasks to 119 pairs of 42-month-old twins and 
found that 60% of the sample variance in ToM could be attributed to genetic factors 
using model-fitting regression (Hughes & Cutting, 1999). However, a larger study 
with 1,104 twin pairs aged 60 months, found that genetic factors did not account for 
significant variation in ToM performance, but rather shared and non-shared 
environmental factors were important (Hughes et al., 2005). Interestingly, the small 
amount of variance in ToM attributable to genetic factors was also found to influence 
verbal ability. The discrepancy between the two studies may be due to the 
differences in statistical power and/or because there was a higher proportion of 
children from lower socio-economic status backgrounds in the second study. 
Additionally, the results may indicate different influences at 42 and 60 months of age 
and may provide support for a hybrid model, whereby the environment becomes 
more influential with age (Tager-Flusberg, 2001). More recently Ronald, Happe, 
Hughes & Plomin (2005) found evidence for the influence of genetic, shared and 
non-shared environment on ToM.
11Attachment, *  mind-mindedness* and ToM
Individual differences in exposure to ‘mental state talk’ commence at an early age 
and this is hypothesised to have an effect on ToM development (e.g. Symons, 2004). 
Indeed, attachment research has focussed on the mothers’ ability to mentalize about 
her child’s needs. Mind-mindedness describes ‘the mother’s proclivity to treat her 
infant as an individual with a mind’ showing sensitivity and responding appropriately 
to the infant’s mental states (Meins, Femyhough, Fradley & Tuckey, 2001). Meins et 
al. (2001) found that appropriate mind-related comments were a significant predictor 
of infants’ security of attachment at 12 months. They also found that mind- 
mindedness was able to distinguish between categories of attachment, namely secure, 
secure-avoidant and secure-resistant. Mothers in the insecure groups made fewer 
appropriate mind-related comments than in the secure group.
Modelling this ability to represent another’s mind seems to be one of the important 
factors for the infant’s development of ToM. Securely attached children are seen to 
outperform their insecurely attached peers on standard ToM tasks (e.g. Fonagy, 
Redfem & Charman, 1997). Research has also shown that children whose parents 
use disciplinary strategies focusing on mental states succeed on false-belief tasks 
earlier (e.g. Ruffin  an, Pemer & Parkin, 1999).
Socio economic status (SES)
Correlations have been found between ToM performance and SES (e.g. Hughes et 
al., 2005) and parental occupational class and mothers' education (Cutting & Dunn, 
2002). Maternal talkativeness is also related to SES, with overall talk and child- 
directed talk less in low SES families. This in turn predicts young children’s
12vocabulary and indeed has recently been shown to mediate the effect of SES on early 
vocabulary developments (Hoff, 2003). Hughes et al. (2005) argue that their results 
suggest that maternal speech may mediate the effect of SES on ToM. This hypothesis 
is yet to be tested, but it is worth considering the benefits of exploring why mothers 
from low SES families do not talk to their children as much and designing 
interventions to encourage more talking, especially in regard to mental states.
Culture
Originally, Avis & Harris (1991) found evidence for cross-cultural similarities in 
ToM acquisition, but since then Wellman & Langattuta (2000) and Vinden (1999) 
have demonstrated cultural variation in the rate and course of false-belief acquisition. 
In addition, Lillard (1998) found cultural differences in ToM in adults. It has been 
argued that these differences have close links to language use.
Sibling factors
Children from larger families tend to show accelerated understanding of false-belief 
and it appears that there is a stronger effect for younger siblings (Ruffman, Pemer, 
Naito, Parkin & Clements, 1998). This is in contrast to the usual advantage of first­
borns in their language and cognitive development. The possible explanations for 
this finding are that older siblings act as a social partner for the younger sibling or 
that younger siblings observe older siblings within their interactions with others 
(Hughes & Leekham, 2004). Lewis, Freeman, Kyriakidou, Maridaki-Kassotaki & 
Berridge (1996) have proposed a ‘general apprenticeship’ model in which 
interactions with a variety of family members are important. Interestingly, the link
13between family size and ToM is strongest for less linguistically competent children 
(Jenkins & Astington, 1996).
In summary, there are cognitive, neurological and social factors to be considered 
when studying the development of individual differences in ToM. There is evidence 
that ToM ability is affected by verbal ability (Jenkins and Astington, 1996) and, in 
addition, executive function (see Pemer & Lang (1999) for a review). It is also 
influenced by exposure to ‘mental state talk’ (Symons, 2004) which arguably could 
account for many of the social factors discussed.
While evidence is limited, it may be that there are stronger effects of genetics on 
early ToM milestones and that there is an increasing effect of the environment on 
ToM development as a child gets older (Tager-Flusberg, 2001). An interesting 
consideration is that there may be bi-directional relationships between ToM and 
many of the environmental factors or other aspects of cognitive development. For 
example, ToM may further the development of peer relationships and this in turn 
may provide more opportunities for promoting ToM development. It is clear that 
ToM continues to develop past the pre-school years, throughout school and continues 
to develop into adolescents and adulthood (e.g. Bosacki & Astington, 1999; 
O’Connor & Hirsch, 1999).
Measuring ToM
ToM research began with the use of classic (or ‘first-order’) false-belief tasks and it 
was found that most children started to pass these tasks around 4 years of age (see 
Table 1). Different tasks are often used in a battery and the scores aggregated, for
14example between 0-5. The advantage of doing this is that a continuum of scores can 
be obtained and individual differences in the consolidation of ToM abilities can be 
looked at. However, most children older than 4 years pass these false-belief tasks and 
therefore the tasks are subject to ceiling effects with older children. Second order 
false-belief tasks (see Table 1) can be used with children between 4-8 years as they 
are more complex, requiring children to predict behaviour based on what a story 
character thinks another person thinks. Again, ceiling effects are likely to be found 
with older children. Researchers have therefore devised more advanced tests of 
theory of mind which can be used with older children and adults (see Table 1). Very 
recently, simple deception tasks have been developed and used with children 
younger than 3 years in order to measure ToM at this early age (see Table 1).
A primary difficulty in measuring ToM is operationalising it. ToM is used within 
everyday social interactions and it is a challenge to reflect this within a research task. 
It is important to bear in mind what is actually being measured by the ToM tasks in a 
research study and how this relates to everyday use of social cognition. Some 
researchers have tried to navigate round this challenge by measuring behaviours 
(observation or parent / teacher ratings) thought to require ToM, or by using 
transcripts of interactions (e.g. Barsch & Wellman, 1995).
As ToM is related to verbal ability and age, in order to look at individual differences 
in ToM, controlling for these factors is important.
15Table 1
Theory of  Mind tasks
Age typically 
administered
Type of 
ToM task
Scoring Requirements Examples
Less than 3 
years
Deception Pass/ fail Ability to 
deceive another 
person
Penny hiding 
game (Baron- 
Cohen, 1992; 
Hughes et al., 
1998)
Pretence Pass/ fail Ability to show 
pretence
Elicited pretend 
play (Fein, 1975 
cited in Hughes & 
Ensor, 2006)
3-4 years old First order 
false-belief -  
considered 
the ‘litmus 
test’ of ToM
Pass/ fail 
-scores from 
a set of tasks 
are often 
aggregated.
Ability to 
predict another’s 
behaviour by 
referring to their 
mental state
Sally-Ann task 
(Baron-Cohen, 
1985)
The Smarties test 
(Pemer et al, 
1989); Can’t sleep 
picture book 
(Moerbeek, 1994)
4-8 years old Second order 
false-belief 
or advanced 
test of ToM
Pass/ fail Prediction of 
another’s 
behaviour or 
mental state 
based on what a 
story protagonist 
thinks another 
person thinks
Second order 
false-belief (based 
on Pemer & 
Wimmer, 1985),
8 years 
upwards
Advanced 
tests for 
older 
children/ 
adults
Continuum For example, 
decide what a 
person is 
thinking or 
feeling from a 
picture of their 
eyes (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 
2001)
Strange Stories 
(Happe, 1994) 
Eyes (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 
2001)
16The relationship between ToM and emotional and behavioural difficulties
Peer rejected children and popularity
Peer rejected children tend to lack positive interactions with their peers and typically 
show aggressive or withdrawn behaviour. Peer rejection shows continuity over time 
and is associated with a wide range of short and long term effects, such as school 
withdrawal, anxiety and academic failure (Malik & Fumham, 1993).
Competency in false-belief comprehension has been associated with many positive 
outcomes for children’s peer interactions, including increases in shared pretend play 
(Hughes & Dunn, 1997; Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995), 
connected communication with peers (Slomkowski & Dunn, 1996) keeping a secret 
and ability to play ‘hide and seek’ (Peskin & Ardino, 2003). ToM can be viewed as a 
powerful social tool. Some evidence has been generated showing an association 
between ToM performance and measures of social performance (for example the 
work of Dunn and colleagues) and this is reviewed by Astington (2003) in the aptly 
named chapter ‘Sometimes necessary, never sufficient’. This refers to the evidence 
linking ToM to social ability, but acknowledges a complex relation in which context, 
motivation and choice influence how ToM is used. For example, it has long since 
been acknowledged that a well developed ToM does not guarantee prosocial 
behaviour (for example in bullying) and this will be discussed later.
Some research suggests that social skills are associated with popularity (e.g. Watson, 
Nixon, Wilson & Capage, 1999). With this in mind and in light of research 
suggesting associations between social skills and ToM (albeit complex), it could be
17tentatively hypothesised that ToM and popularity may be associated. There are six 
studies looking at ToM in relation to peer acceptance and rejection (see Table 2 for 
details of each study). The research is carried out with 3-6 year old children. All 
studies used first order false-belief tasks, except Badenes, Estevan & Bacete (2000) 
who additionally used the Strange Stories (Happe, 1994).
ToM and popularity was originally investigated by Watson et al. (1999), who found 
that false-belief understanding was a significant predictor of teacher rated social 
skills, but not teacher rated popularity. In support of this finding, Cuming and 
Repacholi (1999, cited in Repacholi, Slaughter, Pritchard & Gibbs, 2003) found that 
children with no or few mutual friends at preschool were better at ToM than those 
with many friends.
The study by Watson et al. (1999) is the only study reported here to measure 
popularity by teacher ratings, as subsequent research has measured popularity using 
peer nomination, whereby children nominate who they like to play with the most and 
least. Typically the number of ratings assigned to each child is summed and the child 
is categorised as popular, average, controversial or rejected. This can be referred to 
as their ‘sociometric status’. The five other studies in Table 2 indicate associations 
between ToM and popularity. The results of the Watson et al. (1999) study may 
differ because of this methodological difference. It is also difficult to compare the 
results of the Watson et al. (1999) study to the other studies because Watson et al. 
(1999) did not analyse their data by age or gender as in some of the other studies.
18Badenes et al. (2000) found a gender difference at the beginning of their analysis and 
so analysed males and females separately. They found a difference between popular 
girls and ‘rejected and average girls’ and in particular popular girls were better at 
deception. Interestingly, this was true even when a self concept measure was 
controlled for and so it is suggested that this was due to competence rather than 
confidence in the girls. However, it should be noted that they only had five girls in 
the rejected group and so the results do not show us much about them, but rather a 
difference is indicated between popular and average children. An interesting finding 
regarding the male subjects was a significant interaction between age and 
sociometric status in their effects upon ToM. On closer analysis they found that 
within the six year old age group, significant differences were found between the 
sociometric groups, but this was not the case for the four or five year old groups: 
peer-rejected boys in the older group obtained the lowest score on the White-lie task 
(from Happe, 1994) compared to the popular and average boys.
McNab (2001) measured the peer acceptance of 80 4 - 5 year olds in three different 
ways: as rated by all the children in the class, as rated only by males, and as rated 
only by females. Interestingly, with language ability controlled for, false-belief 
performance was correlated with peer acceptance as rated by females only. This 
study may suggest differences between how boys and girls rate their peers. It may be 
the case that girls value ToM skills (or social behaviours influenced by ToM) in their 
friends more than boys.
The gender differences found by Badenes et al. (2000) and McNab (2001) are very 
interesting; it is of note that research often shows female superiority in ToM tasks
19(e.g. Baron-Cohen, Joliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997). It may be that ToM skills 
flourish in popular girls and that ToM skills make girls more attractive to have as 
friends. ToM skills may be of less importance to boys and their friendships and, in 
particular, to younger boys.
In a study by Slaughter, Dennis and Pritchard (2002; see Table 2 for details), initial 
analysis of the data, with age and verbal scores controlled for, showed that ToM was 
not a significant predictor of sociometric category although prosocial behaviour was. 
However, using a mean age split, Slaughter et al. (2002) found comparable results to 
Badenes et al.’s (2000) male participants for both boys and girls analysed together. 
They found that, in children younger than 61 months prosocial behaviour was the 
only significant predictor of social preference. In other words younger children’s 
peer acceptance is best predicted by their behaviour and this may be more important 
than the ability to read mental states. However, in children older than 61 months 
ToM was the best predictor although the result did not reach significance (p < .08) 
and neither did the regression equation. However, some evidence is generated here 
that may suggest that as children grow older it becomes more important for friends to 
have ToM skills.
Results from Badenes et al. (2000) and Slaughter et al. (2002) suggest that ToM may 
become more important for peer popularity as children get older. It is hypothesised 
that children older than 5 years who are lacking ToM skills may not be able to 
develop and sustain peer relations at a level now more deeply required by this age 
group. For example, being able to infer the thoughts, feelings and motivations of 
their friends and being able to act sensitively as a result. This may have serious
20consequences, as they are likely to be less popular or rejected as a result, and 
consequently will not be exposed to social interactions imperative for ToM 
development. Sociometric status may, therefore, be perpetuated for some children by 
eventual impairments in ToM. However, the limitations of the studies should be 
bome in mind and firm conclusions can not be drawn.
Peterson & Siegal (2002) identified 57 popular and 52 rejected children from a 
sample of 285 preschoolers aged 3-5 years using peer nomination. Interestingly, 
they also looked at the effects of having one stable, mutual friendship on children 
within both groups. Popular children scored significantly higher on false-belief 
performance than rejected children. Importantly, a stable mutual friendship was 
shown to be important for false-belief performance in both popular and rejected 
children. Of interest, there was no significant difference between popular and 
rejected children who scored above the median verbal mental age. However, rejected 
children scoring below the median were significantly worse than the popular children 
scoring below the median.
Finally, a study by Cassidy, Werner, Rourke & Zubemis (2003) examined the 
relation of social behaviour, as measured by several different means (see Table 2), 
and ToM. They found that verbal ability and ToM uniquely contributed to the 
prediction of sociometric rating of popularity, however the total amount of variance 
explained was modest. They also found that affective perspective taking predicted 
unique variance for receiving prosocial behaviour from peers. The results suggest 
that better ToM skills can result in being liked more by peers and receiving more 
prosocial responses from them.
21Table 2
ToM, peer rejected children and popularity
Authors
(Year)
Title Age N ToM tasks used Social behaviour/ Peer acceptance 
measure
Badenes et 
al. (2000)
Theory of mind and 
peer rejection
4-6y 313 Sally Ann (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983) 
Deception task (Peskins, 1992)
12 strange stories (Happe, 1994)
Peer rated sociometric status (Amiga’s, 
1983) Pupil Evaluation Inventory (Pekarik 
et al, 1976) Self-concept questionnaire 
(Piers, 1977)
Cassidy et al. 
(2003)
The relationship 
between 
psychological 
understanding and 
positive social 
behaviours
3ylm-
5y5m
67 False-belief (modified form Wimmer 
& Pemer, 1983)
Deception (adapted from Chandler, 
Fritz & Hala, 1989).
Emotion state understanding: affective 
perspective taking (APT, Denham, 
1986).
Teacher: Social skills rating system - 
Preschool Form (Gresham & Elliot,
1990).
Peer rating sociometric status (Denham & 
Holt, 1993).
Classroom observation.
McNab
(2001)
Peer acceptance and 
theory of mind
4-5y 80 Social false-belief task (Nguyen & 
Frye, 1999)
Peer sociometric rating (Denham, 
McKinley, Couchoud, & Holt, 1990) 
Perceived Competence Scale for Children 
(Harter, 1979)
Peterson & 
Siegal (2002)
Mind reading and 
moral awareness in 
popular and rejected 
preschoolers
4y8m 109 Location task (adapted from Baron- 
Cohen etal., 1985).
Misleading appearances of objects 
(false-belief)
Peer rated sociometric status (Coie & 
Dodge, 1983).
Friendship interview (adapted from 
Gershman & Hayes, 1983 by Sanderson & 
Siegal, 1995)
Slaughter et 
al. (2002)
- study 1
Theory of mind and 
peer acceptance in 
preschool children
4y5m-
6y0m
78 2 unexpected contents (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988)
Conflicting emotion task Conflicting
Peer rated sociometric status (Coie & 
Dodge, 1983)desire task
The Four Sweets task (Baron-Cohen, 
1994)
Slaughter et 
al. (2002)
- study 2
Theory of mind and 
peer acceptance in 
preschool children
4y0m-
6y7m
87 2 change in location (adapted from 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985) 
2 unexpected contents (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988)
Peer rated sociometric status (Coie & 
Dodge, 1983)
Headteacher rated questionnaire - 
prosocial behaviour, aggressive behaviour 
and Machiavellianism (see later).
Watson et al. 
(1999)
- study 2
Social interaction 
skills and theory of 
mind in young 
children
3y4m-
6yllm
52 2 false-belief tests (adapted from 
Pemer & Wimmer, 1987
Perceived Competence Scale for Children 
(Harter, 1979)-teacher rated
Watson et al. 
(1999)
-study 1
Social interaction 
skills and theory of 
mind in young 
children
3y9m-
6y8m
26 2 false-belief tests (adapted from 
Pemer & Wimmer, 1987
Teacher rated social skills on 5 pt likert 
scaleAttention difficulties and behaviour problems
Attention difficulties in children vary in severity and some children have co­
occurring difficulties with hyperactivity and impulsive behaviour, and thus can be 
diagnosed as having attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; DSM-IV,
1994). Behaviour problems can be classified in different ways, for example children 
with disruptive or aggressive behaviour and children diagnosed as having conduct 
disorder (CD). DSM-IV criteria allow for differential diagnosis between groups, for 
example with ADHD and CD, but in clinical practice these difficulties often co­
occur. In younger children there is much lower reliability of diagnoses and in terms 
of research, much broader categories have been identified, for example ‘hard-to- 
manage’ children (Hughes, Dunn & White, 1998) or ‘at-risk-of-ADHD’ children 
(Pemer, Kain & Barchfield, 2002).
The relationship between ToM and attention difficulties and/ or behaviour problems 
has been studied in children from 2-18 years (see Table 3). Due to the continual 
development of ToM, researchers have used different ToM tasks depending on age. 
It was originally hypothesised that children with CD would have impaired or 
different ToM skills, possibly due to environmental influences (Happe & Frith, 
1996). Indeed, it was thought that impaired ToM may account for their social 
difficulties as this had been found in children with autism (Happe & Frith, 1996). Of 
note from the literature already covered, Badenes et al. (2001) found that the total 
scores for the Strange Stories (Happe, 1994) correlated negatively with aggressive 
and socially withdrawn behaviour, but the presence of overt aggression was not 
related to poor performance on ToM. Cassidy et al. (2003) did not find a significant 
relationship between a problem behaviour score and ToM abilities.
24Pre-adolescents
ToM was first studied in relation to behavioural problems in pre-adolescents with 
CD. Happe & Frith (1996) investigated ToM in 18 children (16 boys and 2 girls) 
with CD (satisfying criteria from DSM-IV; APA, 1994) aged 6-12 years. They used 
a control group of 8 children aged 7-9 years of average ability. Participants were 
matched for verbal mental age although the control group had a significantly higher 
verbal IQ. All the children passed two standard first order false-belief tasks.
Happe & Frith (1996) also administrated the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scales 
(VABS; Sparrow et al, 1984) with supplementary social and maladaptive items. Half 
of the supplementary items were categorised as behaviours requiring mentalization 
and half did not require this. The VABS indicated overall substantial social 
impairment within the CD group. Interestingly, 10 out of 18 of the children with CD 
scored poorly on the items requiring mentalization compared to only one child from 
the normal group. This gives some evidence that the children with CD have some 
impairment in mentalizing in their everyday lives. Of interest, children with CD most 
clearly showed their mentalizing ability for antisocial behaviour, for example lying 
and teasing and this led to Happe and Frith (1996) suggesting a theory of  nasty minds 
(see later).
Also researching pre-adolescents, Sutton, Reeves & Keogh (2000) looked at ToM 
(Eyes Task, Baron-Cohen, 2001) in relation to disruptive behaviour and avoidance of 
responsibility in a group of 11 -13 year olds. They found that ToM was not 
significantly correlated with disruptive behaviour, but that ToM was positively 
correlated with a denial/ lack of remorse factor. In order to investigate the theory of
25nasty minds they also examined correlations between the type of stimuli in the Eyes 
Task  (either positive, neutral or negative) correctly identified and an avoidance of 
responsibility scale or a disruptive behaviour scale. No correlations were found.
Both of these studies suggest that ToM task performance is not impaired in pre­
adolescent children with behavioural difficulties. In fact, there is some evidence to 
suggest that those with high scores on a denial/ lack of remorse factor have better 
ToM skills. However, the studies both have weaknesses in their attempts to address 
this question: Happe and Frith (1996) used first order false-belief tasks which every 
child passed, hence a ceiling effect may have masked any differences in performance 
between the two groups. Sutton et al. (2000) used a community sample rather than a 
clinical sample and therefore none or few of the children may have been very 
disruptive or avoidant of responsibility. Furthermore, there was a discrepancy 
between the results found in these two studies, as Sutton et al. (2000) did not find 
evidence for a bias in ToM skills as suggested by Happe & Frith’s (1996) analysis of 
teacher rated behaviours. It is possible to consider an alternative explanation for the 
results found by Happe & Frith (1996) as they did not control for impaired language 
skills and executive difficulties (often co-morbid with CD) and these factors may 
account for the differences in teacher rated behaviours. Nevertheless, it is of 
consideration that although not apparent through experimental testing, children with 
behaviour problems may be different to others in their everyday use of mentalization 
skills (Happe & Frith, 1996).
Fahie and Symons (2003) recruited 26 participants, aged 5-9 years, from a clinical 
population and the children had a mixture of ADHD and behavioural problems. 
Aggregated scores for ToM (see Table 3), executive function (EF) and behaviour
26problems (parent and teacher rated) were made. After controlling for age, language 
and socioeconomic (SES) status, ToM was significantly related to all measures of 
EF. Parent and teacher ratings of social problems negatively related to ToM and EF. 
However, social problems and ToM were unrelated once overall EF was partialled 
out, whereas social problems and EF remained related after ToM was partialled out. 
In other words, ToM did not provide unique contributions above general executive 
skills. EF was found to be critical for social function, and a psychosocial impact was 
found on this. Interestingly, children with low SES had lower EF and ToM scores 
and it is suggested that further research is needed to look at this. The study also 
indicates the need to investigate and potentially control for EF when examining ToM 
in children with emotional and behavioural difficulties.
However, the study was limited by the younger children possibly performing at floor 
on the second-order false-belief tasks. Fahie et al. (2003) compared their results to 
other studies and estimated that the children in the study were delayed by about 2 
years in their ToM performance compared to a community comparison group. The 
study would have benefited from a control group. It would also have been interesting 
to have looked at inter group differences, for example those with ADHD and those 
without, in order to gain more information about causal factors.
Pre-school age
Hughes and colleagues studied ToM in much younger children exhibiting some 
behavioural disturbance. Using a questionnaire they identified groups of children 
from a community setting who were labelled as ‘hard-to-manage’ using Goodman’s 
(1997) Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ). Children with a classification
27of ‘hard-to-manage’ scored above the 90th percentile on the hyperactivity scale and 
80% of these children also scored above the 90th percentile for CD.
Forty children, aged between 3 l A - 4 X A years rated by parents as ‘hard-to-manage’ 
were compared with forty control children who were matched for age, gender, school 
and ethnic background (Hughes et al., 1998). With verbal ability taken into account, 
there was a small but significant delay in development of ToM in the hard-to-manage 
preschoolers. Additionally, an uneven profile of performance across story contexts 
was found (nice v nasty surprises). Hard-to-manage children were significantly more 
likely to pass a nasty story than a nice story. However, a significant proportion of 
each group passed neither story and so the statistical model used here involved very 
few numbers and the result should be interpreted cautiously. This result, if 
interpreted as a significant difference, could give evidence for a theory of  nasty 
minds or it could be that it is an accurate reflection of these children’s environments, 
in other words that they do expect a nasty surprise instead of a nice one.
Interestingly, EF and ToM were associated only in the hard-to-manage group 
suggesting direct & indirect links between the two.
In a further study by Hughes, White, Sharpen & Dunn (2000), videotapes of children 
playing were transcribed for physical aggression, intimidating behaviour, rule- 
breaking, snatching, damage to toys, sexual behaviour, helpful actions and 
expression of positive and negative affect. Children also completed a battery of ToM 
(see Table 3), emotion understanding and EF tasks. The results showed that 
compared to the controls, the hard-to-manage group were significantly more likely to 
snatch, bully, tease, hurt a friend, damage a toy, or rule-break, but significantly less
28likely to refuse to share and equally likely to engage in violent talk. Hard-to-manage 
children showed less empathetic/ pro-social responses to their friends. In the hard-to- 
manage group and in the control group there was no increase in explained variance in 
antisocial behaviour when scores on either ToM tasks or affective perspective taking 
tasks were entered into a hierarchical regression. Anti-social behaviour was predicted 
by performance on EF tasks in the hard-to-manage group. The results suggest that 
the inter-personal problems of hard-to-manage children are due to behavioural 
regulation difficulties rather than ToM.
It should be considered that these two studies do not use clinical samples. Whilst the 
classificatory group of ‘hard-to-manage’ may be useful for looking at differences in 
ToM, it should be noted that it has not been studied in terms of its reliability and 
validity in the same way as DSM-IV (APA, 1994) classifications have. It could be 
argued that aggression can be observed in all children and therefore it is viable to 
study it in community samples, but it may be that much larger studies are needed to 
detect group differences. An additional problem with the classification is that 
children were rated as ‘hard-to-manage’ due to attention and behaviour problems and 
this gives low specificity as to the cause of any differences found. Further still, the 
results may not be generalisable to everyday situations as the children were given 
novel, desirable toys and it is interesting that the most common behaviours recorded 
were snatching and not sharing; Hughes et al. (2000) suggested that the environment 
may have been provocative.
Using a similar age group, Spelz, DyKlyen, Calderon, Greenburg & Fisher (1999) 
found that when general vocabulary and test behaviour were controlled for, a clinical
29sample of 80 boys aged 3-5 years meeting the criteria for Oppositional Defiant 
Disorder (ODD), with and without ADHD, had poorer vocabularies for affective 
states than controls. Although, this may not be a well recognised ToM task, it may 
reflect a similar ability. However, the study also highlights the need for increased 
specificity in measuring ToM; whilst the study yielded an interesting finding it is 
hard to compare this to other studies.
Until very recently, there has been no research on ToM and behaviour problems in 
toddlers. There may be a few reasons for this: the construct of ToM before false- 
belief tasks can be passed is not well defined, further still there are few validated 
ways to measure it, and in addition, it is difficult to reliably identify behavioural 
problems in this age group. However, Hughes & Ensor (2006) aggregated a score of 
behaviour problems for 127 toddlers, aged 24 - 36 months, using mothers’ ratings of 
the attention-deficit/ hyperactivity scale from the SDQ, researchers ratings after a 
laboratory visit and by video-coding of non-compliance in a 5-minute mother-child 
tidy up. Three ToM tasks were used, looking at deception, pretence and awareness of 
mistaken beliefs. Hughes and Ensor (2006) also measured verbal ability, EF and 
harsh parenting. They found that harsh parenting, ToM deficits and verbal ability all 
predicted unique variance in behaviour problems. EF was only marginally significant 
in contributing to the variance. Harsh parenting and ToM interacted significantly in 
their effects on behaviour problems. Mean levels of behavioural problems were low 
for all children exposed to low levels of harsh parenting, but were raised for children 
with low ToM skills exposed to medium levels of harsh parenting and for children 
with low and medium ToM skills exposed to high levels of harsh parenting. The 
results may suggest that advanced ToM skills buffer young children against the
30effects of harsh parenting. For example, Hughes & Ensor (2006) suggest ToM skills 
may be protective against hypothesised ‘coercive cycles of violence’ (Paterson,
1981); it can be theorised that ToM skills enable these children to recognise and 
anticipate others’ thoughts and feelings. Replication and extension (e.g. a 
longitudinal design) of this study is imperative as the results may have great 
implications as they highlight just how important ToM can be to very young 
children, especially those exposed to harsh parenting. The study suggests that 
intervention programs should target ToM skill development in this vulnerable group 
of children.
A focus on attention difficulties
Four of the studies in Table 3 have looked specifically at ToM in relation to attention 
difficulties in children. As part of a study by Buitelaar, Van der Wees, Swaab- 
Bameveld & Van der Gaag (1999; see Table 3), ToM performance was looked at 
within a ‘non-autistic psychiatric control group’ which consisted of children with 
either ADHD, CD or dysthymia.  Planned comparisons showed that ADHD children 
(n = 9) performed significantly worse than normal children on second order ToM 
tasks. Those with CD or dysthymia (n = 11) were matched to their controls and no 
group effect was found. However, it should be noted that during discriminant factor 
analyses seven out of nine children with ADHD were placed within the Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder (PDD) group and nine out of eleven with dysthmia or CD 
were placed in the normal group. Indeed, many of the children with ADHD had 
similar attentional problems to those with PDD. Therefore, although the study 
suggests that children with ADHD perform differently on ToM tasks, the findings are 
based on a very small sample of children with ADHD who had severe attention
31problems. It is understandable that children with severe attention difficulties will 
perform badly on these conceptual tasks. Indeed, Pemer et al. (2002) noted four 
children in their study as ‘predominantly inattentive’ (as compared to other children) 
and found that these children had significantly more difficulties on ToM tasks.
Out of 234 children that Pemer et al. (2002) recruited, 24 were rated by teachers and 
parents as ‘at risk of ADHD’, using a lenient classification of hyperactivity 
(requiring the identification of 8 items in contrast to 16 needed for standard 
classification), impulsivity and /or attention deficit. This classification may be 
advantageous as ADHD often goes undiagnosed in pre-school years when activities 
are play-based and less structured than at school (Pemer et al., 2002). They found no 
significant difference between the ‘at risk of ADHD’ and a control group’s ToM 
scores. However, it should be noted that all children (except those with low IQs) 
were at ceiling on first order false-belief tasks. Additionally, the design had little 
power as a small sample size was used initially and a further 6 participants were 
dropped from analysis of group difference (due to missing data) leaving only 18 in 
the at-risk-of ADHD group.
It should be noted that many of the studies above had more male than female 
participants and Charman, Carroll & Sturge (2001) only included male participants. 
The boys satisfied criteria for ADHD combined disorder (DSM-IV) and hyperkinetic 
disorder (ICD-10), but children comorbid for CD were excluded. There was no 
significant difference between the ADHD group and controls in ToM scores (Strange 
Stories, Happe 1994), although it was noted that this could have been due to a ceiling 
effect. Importantly, the children were given one to one support in order to complete
32the tasks as this is known to help them concentrate. This level of structure or support 
is unrepresentative of their usual circumstance in the outside world and could 
account for the lack of correlation between ToM in the clinic to social behaviour 
outside. Whilst it is a methodological challenge to research this, it will be important 
to find out if children with ADHD have specific difficulties in applying their ToM 
skills.
Sodian and Hulsken (2005) endeavoured to do this by including the Epistemic State 
Attribution Task (ESAT). The ESAT requires online representation of mental states 
with conflicting behavioural outcomes and high inhibitory demands. This can 
therefore be viewed as a more naturalistic test of ToM. They recruited 32 children 
with ADHD and 101 controls aged 6-11 years and administered a second order 
false-belief task, the Strange Stories (Happe, 1994) and the ESAT. They found no 
significant differences between the two groups on second-order false-belief or the 
Strange Stories, consistent with Pemer et al. (2002) and Charman et al. (2001), but 
there was a significant group difference on the ESAT. This may be a more 
appropriate task to use, tapping into the difficulties in ToM which would be expected 
in this group.
Whilst there is minimal evidence of group differences on first and second order false- 
belief tasks, it is fascinating that in a study using a more naturalistic ToM task, 
children with ADHD do not perform as well as controls (Sodian & Huskan, 2005). 
The more traditional ToM tasks may not pick up the difficulties which children with 
ADHD have in mentalizing on a daily basis. Indeed, Charman et al. (2001) found a 
correlation between social skills and ToM performance in a control group, but not in
33an ADHD group who were rated by their parents to be less socially competent. A 
second, interesting finding from these studies is the relationship between ToM and 
EF; significant correlations were found between ToM and EF (Pemer et al., 2002), 
but some children were significantly impaired on EF tasks in relation to ToM (Pemer 
et al., 2002; Charman et al., 2001), providing evidence for dissociation between these 
two skills. The research may also suggests that attention difficulties affect ToM 
ability differently at different ages; studies looking at younger children found 
evidence of associations, whereas the evidence is mixed in studies with older 
children. It may be that EF skills are very important for ToM in young children, but 
as the influence of other factors becomes more important (e.g. peer relationships and 
interactions with others) the association between EF and ToM weakens. Indeed,
Fahie et al. (2003) found that a scatterplot suggested that ToM and EF may be more 
strongly related for younger children than older children.
A note on aggressive behaviour
Aggression is generally thought to arise from deficiencies or biases in social 
information processing (Crick & Dodge, 1994). When considering behaviour 
problems and aggression, it is imperative to incorporate into our thinking research 
about different types of aggression. Much research has been carried out to distinguish 
different types of aggression (see review by Coie & Dodge, 1998), for example 
instrumental versus bullying, relational versus physical and reactive versus proactive. 
Reactive and proactive aggression are useful terms in order to make a distinction 
between ‘hot-headed’ aggressive reactions and aggression which is pre-planned. In 
considering this difference, it seems immediately obvious that the ToM skills 
involved may be different. It may be predictable that children with CD or who are
34physically aggressive towards others (typically reactive aggression) will be different 
to children using proactive aggression, for example, those who bully verbally or 
children described as Machiavellian. This may account for the evidence that some 
children with behavioural problems (for example CD) have impaired ToM skills and 
some children (for example bullies) may have superior ToM skills. Additionally, it is 
useful to consider the possibility of a developmental shift in ToM use in aggression 
as there is a general trend from direct to indirect aggression with age (Rivers & 
Smith, 2004, cited in Sutton, Smith & Swettenham, 1999b).
Bullying
Bullying is recognised as a serious problem which threatens the emotional wellbeing 
and academic achievement of children. Head-teachers throughout the UK have a 
duty to have an anti-bullying policy in their schools (dfES, 2007). Whether there are 
individual differences in ToM between children playing different roles within a 
bullying system is not just an important research question, but has important 
potential implications for interventions.
When considering children who bully, it seems prudent to consider two types of 
bully; a physically aggressive bully and a more calculating, indirect bully. An intact 
ToM seems important for both types of bully in order to avoid detection, but one can 
hypothesise that the more verbal, indirect bully who causes more subtle suffering 
through relational methods may have a sophisticated ToM and show a superiority in 
these skills. It makes sense that this type of bullying (spreading rumours, 
undermining people etc) requires good hypothesising about others thoughts, beliefs 
and desires. Indeed, evidence for this notion comes from studies on social
35intelligence (related to ToM) by Kaukiainen and colleagues (Kaukiainen et al., 1996, 
1999; Bjorkqvist et al., 2000) who have found positive relations between indirect 
aggression and peer-rated social intelligence.
Only two studies have looked at ToM in bullies (see Table 3). Sutton, Smith and 
Swettenham (1999) used an adapted version of the Participant Role Scale (Salmivalli 
et al., 1996) as a self/peer nomination interview relating to role in bullying. This 
derives bully, assistant, reinforcer, defender, outsider and victim. They used 11 short 
stories to assess ToM (from Happe, 1994) and emotion understanding (Sutton, 
unpublished). Teachers also completed questionnaires on type of bullying and 
motivation to bully. Age and verbal ability were controlled for. Bullies scored 
significantly higher on the stories than all the other groups ('victims, assistants and 
reinforcers) involved in the bullying process, but not the outsiders. Additionally, 
bullies scored higher than assistants and reinforcers on the emotion stories. The 
correlation between teacher rated bullying and ToM was not significant. Neither was 
there a significant correlation between physical bullying and ToM, however a 
positive correlation between teacher-rated verbal bullying and ToM was found. This 
supports the notion of ToM being linked to relational or indirect bullying, but not to 
physically aggressive bullying.
Monks, Smith & Swettenham (2005) investigated the social cognitive abilities, 
executive function skills and attachment profiles of 104 children aged 4-6 years 
who were classified as aggressors, victims and defenders. They found no significant 
difference between groups on ToM or deception tasks and, hence, did not replicate 
the findings of Sutton et al. (1999).
36Sutton (2003) persuades his reader to think of anti-social behaviour as social 
behaviour with its own set of goals and motivations such as winning over new 
friends. He suggests we consider emotional understanding, empathy, 
Machiavellianism, social competition, self-esteem and reputation-enhancement 
strategies when considering bulling.
Machiavellianism (Mach)
A person described as Machiavellian (Mach) believes that others can be manipulated 
and actively engages in manipulative, exploitive behaviour for his or her own 
personal gain (Wilson, Near & Miller, 1996, cited in Repacholi, Slaughter, Pritchard 
& Gibbs, 2003). Mach adults are described as successful manipulators, successful 
persuaders, better at situations in which they need to steal, lie or cheat and are rated 
as more intelligent and charming (see Repacholi et al., 2003). The relationship 
between bullying and Mach is currently a focus of research. For example Sutton and 
Keogh (2000) found that children who identified themselves as bullies had 
significantly higher Mach scores than control children. Indeed it is questioned by 
Repacholi et al. (2003) whether a distinction between bullies and Machs can actually 
be made.
In order to be a successful Mach it makes theoretical sense that you would have a 
well-functioning ToM as you must out-wit others in order to manipulate them, 
influencing another’s thoughts, feelings and behaviour (Repacholi et al., 2003). One 
study in Table 3 has looked at ToM and Mach.
37Repacholi and Gibbs (2000; cited in Repacholi et al., 2003) investigated 
interrelations between Mach, ToM, attributional style, and empathetic disposition in 
9-12 year olds. 137 children completed a scale measuring Mach in children and 
those at either end of the scale were categorised as low Mach (n = 27) and high Mach 
(n = 29). The high Machs had significantly higher social desirability scores. With 
language, verbal fluency and gender controlled for, there was no significant 
difference between high and low Mach groups in their overall ToM or empathy. 
Interestingly, the high Mach group produced more negative intent attributions than 
the low Mach group in the non-verbal measure of ToM and were more likely to 
predict negative outcomes in the vignettes.
In a study reported earlier in this review (see Table 2), Slaughter et al. (2002) also 
looked at the relations between scores on a newly developed Mach scale for children 
and verbal ability, ToM, aggressive and pro-social behaviours and sociometric status. 
With verbal ability controlled for, Mach scores were negatively correlated with 
prosocial behaviour and positively correlated with aggression scores. However, there 
was no relation between ToM and Mach scores. Mach scores were not correlated 
with social preference scores (indicating how well liked they are) but were with 
social impact scores (indicating how noticed they are).
Slaughter et al. (2002) conclude that Mach is a ‘distinct interpersonal behavioural 
style that develops separately from the cognitive requisite - ToM -  that supports it’. 
However, the measure and classification of Mach can be criticised in both studies. 
The first study used a community sample in which high Machs were classified in 
relation to the rest of the group and may therefore not have been particularly
38Machiavellian at all. In addition, it would have been useful to have included a control 
group of average children with which to compare those scoring high and low on the 
Mach scale; it is not clear if children scoring either high or low on Machiavellianism 
are both average or superior mind readers. It is possible that both of these groups 
have superior skills which they use for different purposes. It is unclear what exactly 
was measured by the Mach scale in the second study as Machiavellianism has not 
been investigated in children this young before and it was completed by teachers and 
so reflects behaviour rather than the subjective attitudinal components important of 
the Mach construct.
Both studies support the hypothesis that children scoring highly on Mach have intact 
ToM skills, but do not show superior skills. However, a second hypothesis proposed 
is that high Machs have a specific quality to their ToM, for example a cognitive bias 
(e.g. Dodge, 1993) or theory of nasty minds (Happe & Frith, 1996). Some support 
was gained for this as high Machs were more likely to report another’s behaviour to 
include trickery, selfishness or rejection and were more likely to predict that 
situations were likely to lead to negative outcomes (Repacholi & Gibbs, 2000).
A third hypothesis suggests that Machs may have a lack of emotional arousal which 
fails to inhibit antisocial behaviour and therefore high Machs can readily apply their 
mind reading skills to obtain their own objective at the expense of other people 
(Repacholi et al., 2003). Indeed, evidence for this is suggested by a link between 
Machiavellianism and a subclinical form of psychopathy. Research suggests that 
those with psychopathy have intact ToM skills (Blair et al., 1996) but impoverished 
skills in empathy (e.g. Blair, 1995). Empathizing can be thought of as the emotional
39response to another’s mental state and can explain why people are typically inhibited 
from acting antisocially towards others once they have used ToM skills to infer how 
another person may think or feel. Blair and colleagues have described ‘moral 
socialization’, which develops due to the aversive experience most people encounter 
when they cause distress to another. It is of interest that evidence has been generated 
to show that behavioural disturbance is related to performance on a moral/ 
conventional distinction task (Blair, Monson & Frederickson, 2001). However, it 
should be noted that neither of the studies reported here found evidence of a lack of 
empathy in those children with higher Mach scores. Repacholi et al. (2003) suggest 
that high Machs may not lack empathetic affect but instead may be better at 
regulating such feelings. This might be particularly pertinent if they were to interfere 
with personal goals or it may be that achievement of personal goals produces a 
positive affect which outweighs any negative feelings. Machs may also use reasoning 
to justify their actions and therefore limit remorse or guilt.
Finally, a fourth hypothesis would indicate that whilst high Machs have average 
ToM skills they may choose to use them in specific ways.
What is the evidence for a theory of  nasty minds?
The ‘theory of nasty minds’ suggested by Happe and Frith (1996) was proposed to 
account for adept mentalization for antisocial behaviour by children with CD. The 
theory would suggest that some children are biased towards making negative 
interpretations of others’ thoughts or intentions and that they develop better ToM 
skills for making interpretations of antisocial behaviour. The theory is supported by 
the findings that children with conduct disorder tend to attribute intentions coming
40from other children in aggressive situations as hostile (Dodge, 1993). In a study 
reviewed here, Badenes et al. (2000) looked at the percentage of aggressive biases in 
answers given for Happe’s (1994) Strange Stories. The percentage of aggressive 
biases was significantly higher for the aggressive boys (54%) compared to average 
boys (33%) and popular boys (13%). Some evidence for this theory was also found 
in the study by Hughes et al. (1998). However, other studies have not found a bias, 
for example Buitellar et al. (1999) and Sutton, Reeves and Koegh (2000).
Ronald et al. (2005) investigated the theory of nasty minds further in a twin study. 
They proposed two models to account for ToM. The ‘interaction’ model 
hypothesises ToM as a single ability, ‘which interacts with individual differences in 
temperament to produce a variety of behaviours that vary between children’. The 
‘alternative’ model is that ‘Nice ToM and Nasty ToM are two distinct cognitive 
abilities, with possibly distinct developmental trajectories, and distinct aetiologies’. 
Ronald et al. (2005) used twin pairs to investigate nice (prosocial) and nasty 
(antisocial) behaviours which either did or did not require ToM as rated by their 
mothers. Using exploratory factor analysis four factors were yielded and it was 
proposed that these related to prosocial and antisocial behaviour necessitating ToM, 
and prosocial and antisocial behaviour not necessitating ToM. Bivariate analyses 
indicated somewhat distinct aetiological influences on Nice ToM versus Nasty ToM. 
They question if this reflects interactions between ToM and temperament or two 
underlying genetic and cognitively distinct ToM abilities.
It seems important to investigate the use of ToM for prosocial and antisocial acts 
across all different children. A reasonable conclusion may be that children are
41exposed to ToM skills used primarily for one or the other use and this is likely to 
influence their developing skills in ToM (i.e. if they are better at using it for 
prosocial or antisocial behaviour). This may develop a bias or it could be regarded as 
an adaptive response reflecting the child’s world, for example where most 
interactions are hostile, such as peer rejected children or those exposed to harsh 
parenting.
Individual use of ToM
It is important to consider that many factors may influence how an individual 
chooses (whether consciously or unconsciously) to use their ToM skills, including 
motivation and possible gains, and inhibitory responses such as moral socialisation 
and empathy. The notion of intra-individual differences (Keenan, 2003) is important, 
as it seems plausible that the use of ToM skills will fluctuate according to situations 
or type of interaction. In some contexts or relationships it has been found that 
children are more likely to mentalize and at deeper levels (e.g. O’Connor & Hirsch, 
1999). Indeed, motivation for both prosocial and antisocial use of ToM will vary 
greatly according to the situation and context. Emotions and affect regulation appear 
very important in this regard and other factors such as fatigue, mood or stress are 
likely to affect one’s ability to apply ToM skills. The relationship between stress, 
affect regulation and mentalization has been studied in much detail and it is widely 
thought that stress affects one’s ability to mentalize. Indeed it is considered that some 
people will have lower thresholds for ‘switching off mentalization’, for example 
those traumatised in childhood (Fonagy, 2006).
42Table 3
ToM and attention and behaviour difficulties
Authors
(Year)
Title Clinical population/ 
control group
Age N ToM tasks used
Buitelaar et al. 
(1999)
Theory of mind and 
emotion recognition 
functioning in autistic 
spectrum disorders and in 
psychiatric control and 
normal children
Children were categorized 
as having either autistic 
disorder, pervasive 
developmental disorder 
(PDD)-not otherwise 
specified, non-autistic 
psychiatric controls and 
normal. Specifically they 
compared those with 
ADHD and psychiatric 
controls.
8y-
18y
80 6 First order tasks: Picture sequencing measure 
(Baron-Cohen et al. 1985)
Appearance Reality (Baron-Cohen, 1989), Mental- 
physical distinction (Baron-Cohen, 1989), Concept 
of the brain (Baron-Cohen, 1989) M&Ms false- 
belief task (Pemer, Frith, Leslie & Leekham,
1989) Sally-Ann (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). 
Second order task: based on Pemer & Wimmer 
(1985).
Charman et al. 
(2001)
Theory of mind, executive 
function & social 
competence in boys with 
ADHD
ADHD + 
Control group
8y9m
9y0m
22+
22
Strange stories (Happe, 1994)
Fahie & 
Symons (2003)
Executive functioning and 
theory of mind in children 
clinically referred for 
attention and behaviour 
problems
ADHD and Behavioural 
problems -  recruited 
through a clinical setting
5-9y 26 Mistaken identity & contents task (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988)
2 unintended transfer tasks (adapted from Wimmer 
& Pemer, 1983)
Emotional false-belief task (Harris et al., 1989)
Happe & Frith 
(1996)
Theory of mind and social 
impairment in children 
with conduct disorder
Conduct Disorder 6y-
l2y
18 The Smarties test (Pemer et al. 1989)
A version of the Sally-Ann task (Baron-Cohen et 
al, 1985; Wimmer & Pemer, 1983)VABS and extra items relating to mentalization in 
everyday life
Hughes & 
Ensor(2006)
Behaviour problems in 2 
year olds: links with 
individual differences in 
theory of mind, executive 
function and harsh 
parenting.
Behaviour problems 2y 127 Deception-penny hiding game (Baron-Cohen, 
1992; Hughes et al., 1998)
Pretence-elicited pretend play (Fein, 1975) 
Awareness of mistaken beliefs (Moerbeek, 1994; 
Hughes et al., 1998)
Hughes et al. 
(1998)
Trick or treat?: Uneven 
understanding of mind and 
emotion and executive 
dysfunction in ‘hard-to- 
manage’ preschoolers
Hard to manage and 
controls
3y6m
4y6m
40+
40
Can’t sleep book (Moerbeek, 1994)
False-belief (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989)
One-box puppet deception game (Sodian & Frith, 
1992)
Penny-hiding game (Baron-Cohen, 1992)
An emotion understanding task (Denham, 1986)
Hughes et al. 
(2000)
Antisocial, angry and 
unsympathetic: ‘hard-to- 
manage’ preschoolers’ peer 
problems and possible 
cognitive influences
Hard to manage Mean
4y4m
40+
40
Can’t sleep book (Moerbeek, 1994)
False-belief (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989)
One-box puppet deception game (Sodian & Frith, 
1992)
Penny-hiding game (Baron-Cohen, 1992)
An emotion understanding task (Denham, 1986)
Monks et al. 
(2005)
Psychological correlates of 
peer victimization in 
preschool: social cognitive 
skills, executive function 
and attachment profiles
Bullying 4y-6y 104 Deceptive box task (Pemer et al. 1987) 
Unexpected transfer task (Baron-Cohen et al, 
1985)
Second-order false-belief task 
Deception task (Sodian & Frith, 1992)
Pemer et al. 
(2002)
Executive control and 
high-order theory of mind 
in children at risk of 
ADHD
At risk of ADHD and 
control group
4y6m
6y6m
234 Joke/Lie (Leekham, 1991)
Second order false-belief (based on Pemer & 
Wimmer, 1985)Repacholi & 
Gibb, (2000)
Machiavellianism in 
children: Is it related to 
empathy, social-cognitive 
ability and parenting? As 
cited in book
Machiavellian 9y-
I2y
137 Non-verbal measure of ToM -  card sorting 
(Langdon & Coltheart, 1999)
Verbal mind reading task (coding based on 
O’Connor and Hirsch, 1999).
Ronald et al. 
(2005)
Nice and nasty theory of 
mind in pre-school 
children: nature and 
nurture
Twins Early Development 
Study
2y
3y
4y
5195
5436
6427
Questionnaire filled in by mothers about prosocial 
and antisocial behaviour that do or do not 
necessitate ToM.
Slaughter et al. 
(2002)
Theory of mind and peer 
acceptance in preschool 
children
Mach 4-6y 87 2 change in location (adapted from Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie & Frith, 1985)
2 unexpected contents (Gopnik & Astington, 
1988)
Sodian & 
Huskan (2005)
The developmental relation 
of ToM and executive 
functions: a study of 
advanced ToM abilities in 
children with ADHD.
ADHD + 
Control group
6y-
iiy
32
101
Second order false-belief (adapted from Pemer & 
Wimmer, 1985)
Strange stories (Happe, 1994)
Epistemic state attribution task
Sutton et al. 
(1999)
Social cognition and 
bullying; social inadequacy 
or skilled manipulation?
Bullying 7y-
lOy
193 Short stories to assess ToM (from Happe, 1994) 
and emotion understanding (Sutton, unpublished).
Sutton et al. 
(2000)
Disruptive behaviour, 
avoidance of responsibility 
and theory of mind
Disruptive behaviour 11-
13y
81 Eyes task (Baron-Cohen)Internalizing disorders -  anxiety and depression
Dunn (1995) initially looked at false-belief understanding in children aged 40 months 
in relation to self-reports of negative experiences in kindergarten two years later. 
Correlations between ToM and negative experiences were found and it was also 
shown that these children were more sensitive to teacher criticism. A small sample 
size was used and so Dunn and colleagues investigated the finding further.
Cutting & Dunn (2002) looked at individual differences in sensitivity to teacher 
criticism and ToM in 141 children aged 4-5 years. ToM was measured during pre­
school and in their first year at school. They found that individual differences in 
children’s sensitivity to criticism were correlated with both time measurements of 
ToM, but in particular, it was related to ToM performance during pre-school. The 
children’s emotional response to criticism was not predicted by ToM, however the 
likelihood of them saying that they were good at an activity (‘ability rating’) after 
being criticized was predicted by ToM performance. Ability rating is thought to 
measure most directly the child’s self worth after criticism; children with better ToM 
rated themselves with significantly lower ability following criticism. Cutting and 
Dunn (2002) suggest that this immediate negative consequence of superior ToM 
following criticism, may in fact have long term positive consequences if, as a result, 
children work harder and learn more. However, an alternative hypothesis is that these 
children develop a frail sense of self as their well developed ToM makes them better 
at taking on board criticism before their sense of self is developed. Longitudinal 
research looking at outcome is warranted.
46recently ToM deficits have been linked to an increased risk of relapse of major 
depression (Inuoe, Yamada & Kanba, 2006) and therefore perhaps investigation of 
this in children is warranted.
Much interesting research has been carried out looking at mentalization in adults 
with long term mental health problems, for example borderline personality disorder 
(e.g Bateman & Fonagy, 1994) and psychosis (e.g. Langdon & Coltheart, 1999). 
Risk and resilience factors in children are studied by developmental 
psychopathologists and it is worth highlighting that insecure and disorganised 
attachments, and childhood trauma are known risk factors (amongst others) for 
mental health problems in adulthood. Research with these at risk children will be 
extremely useful and the potential implications hugely important.
48Table 4
ToM and internalizing problems
Authors
(Year)
Title Clinical/
non-clinical
problem
Age N ToM task used
Banjeree & 
Henderson 
(2001)
Social cognitive factors in 
childhood social anxiety: 
preliminary investigation
Social
anxiety
USA: 
6.4-11.1 y 
UK:
8.2-9.2 y
63 Standard 2nd order false-belief (Sullivan, Zaitchik & Tager- 
Flusberg, 1994)
Faux pas (O’Riordan et al. 1996)
Explanations for deceptions
Cutting & 
Dunn 
(2002)
The cost of understanding 
other people: social 
cognition predicts young 
children’s sensitivity to 
criticism
Teacher
criticism
4.4-5.7 y 141 TIME 1:
False-belief: Four unexpected location (based on Bartsch and 
Wellman (1989) Two unexpected contents tasks, (based on 
tasks by Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews & Cook, 1989). 
The ‘Can’t sleep’ task from Hughes et al., 1998).
Emotion understanding: affective perspective taking (Denham, 
1986) and an interview.
TIME 2:
1st and 2nd order false belief (Sullivan, Zaitchik & Tager- 
Flusberg, 1994)
Emotion understanding:  mixed emotions
Dunn
(1995)
Children as psychologists: 
The later
correlates of individual 
differences in understanding 
of emotions and other 
minds.
Negative 
experiences 
at school and 
teacher 
criticism
3y4m 46 Unexpected change (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989)Conclusions and Future research
Is there evidence that individual differences in Theory of Mind relate to emotional and 
behavioural difficulties in children?
There is emerging evidence that individual differences in ToM may be associated with 
children’s social, behavioural, attention or emotional problems. There is some evidence 
that less popular children score lower on ToM tasks and that this may be particularly 
true for girls, children without a stable, mutual friendship and older children. It seems 
that girls may consider ToM skills, or the behaviours supported by these skills, in others 
more important when choosing friends and that these become more important for both 
girls and boys as they get older. There is some evidence that young children with 
behavioural problems have impaired ToM, although other research has not found this. 
Research has suggested that older children with behavioural problems and/ or attention 
problems do not show impairment on most experimental ToM tasks. However, there is 
some evidence that these children score lower on more naturalistic ToM measures and 
this may indicate that they have some impairment with everyday use of ToM. As 
children get older, indirect aggression (e.g. relational bullying) becomes prevalent in 
schools and there is some, but limited evidence that indirect aggression is associated 
with superior ToM skills. It is also suggested that people described as Machiavellian 
may have superior ToM skills, but this is yet to be shown empirically. Evidence also 
suggests associations between ToM skills and anxiety/ sensitivity to criticism in young 
children. However, from the research thus far, it would be imprudent to draw fixed 
conclusions. Some of the findings are far from robust and is some cases they may be 
confounded by other factors, such as verbal ability or executive function. Nevertheless,
50it seems that some evidence does suggest that ToM ability and the application of ToM 
can be associated with various childhood difficulties and disorders and the development 
of adult mental health problems.
There are a number of avenues for further research. Firstly, investigating ToM in 
relation to other problems in childhood, for example, depression is warranted. Secondly, 
longitudinal research looking holistically at children’s emotional development would be 
of great interest, to determine if advanced ToM skills are advantageous, at what ages and 
for which children. There is evidence that children with less well developed ToM may 
experience peer rejection, are less protected from harsh parenting and are more likely to 
be victims of bullying. On the other hand, it is suggested that a more developed ToM 
may cause more negative experiences at school and leave you more vulnerable to the 
effects of criticism. This research has clinical implications: ToM training has been 
suggested for school age children lacking ToM skills (e.g. Slaughter et al., 2002) and 
educational implications: Denham (2006) suggested that ToM skills could be an 
indicator of school readiness.
Thirdly, future research is warranted to look at everyday use of ToM in relation to 
emotional and behavioural difficulties in children. A major limitation of the research 
thus far is the measurement of ToM and further research will require the development of 
standardised measures of ToM with good validity and reliability. In particular, there is a 
demand for more naturalistic tasks of ToM to be developed. Two essential differences 
between an experimental task and real life performance are that ToM is normally used 
‘online’ and in a context of motivation. Indeed, Sullivan & Winner (1993) found that
51some children who failed a false-belief task, could pass a similar task involving a real 
life trick, in other words when the child was motivated and actively involved in tricking 
the researcher. Tasks should reflect everyday use of ToM for both prosocial and 
antisocial means and therefore could involve cooperation or competition. One idea is to 
create computer games involving ToM decisions or use virtual reality to devise 
situations in which these skills are required.
Fourthly, the nature of relationships between ToM and emotional and behavioural 
problems is not straightforward; studying individual ToM development within the 
context of other skill development is likely to prove important, for example in relation to 
executive function or empathy.
Fifthly, some research is moving away from looking at whether certain children perform 
well or badly compared to controls on ToM tasks, but differences are being investigated 
with regard to specific use of these skills, for example for prosocial or antisocial 
purposes. It is suggested that children with emotional and behavioural difficulties may 
use ToM skills differently and that this may be a consequence of genetic and 
environmental factors. The study of children described as Machiavellian suggests further 
research of other personality or temperament traits in relation to ToM skills and an 
individual’s use of them.
Finally, further research looking at intra-individual differences, considering the 
application of ToM by an individual in different contexts is warranted. Crucially, this 
literature review suggests a difference between ToM competence and ToM performance
52in everyday situations. Figure 1  depicts the influence of genetic, cognitive and 
environmental factors upon ToM ability, but also illustrates that ToM performance may, 
in addition, be influenced by other factors. Consequently, the model is an attempt to 
bring together information and ideas about the influences on ToM ability and 
performance. Whilst, there is growing empirical evidence about the genetic, cognitive 
and environmental effects on ToM ability, less is known about the factors that affect 
ToM application. It is suggested in Figure 1  that empathy, social moralisation, 
personality, affect regulation and social information processing biases are all likely to 
affect an individual’s ToM use. Whilst some research has investigated the relationship of 
these factors to ToM, this has primarily focused on concrete ToM ability rather than 
everyday ToM use; further research investigating ToM use is warranted. The situational 
factors listed in Figure 1  are also likely to be influential on ToM performance, for 
example the individual’s relationship to the person in question, motivation, mood, 
fatigue or stress. Investigating these factors is an exciting line of research, for example it 
is widely recognised that there is a link between stress and mentalization (e.g. Fonagy, 
1999), but this has only been empirically tested once using ToM tasks (Blair, Granger & 
Razza, 2005). The model therefore brings together current understanding of the 
influences on ToM ability and suggests avenues of future research with regard to ToM 
use. It is possible that by investigating these factors in relation to ToM performance, a 
greater understanding of the relationships between ToM and emotional and behavioural 
difficulties can be developed.
53Figure 1
A model of individual use of ToM1
Genetic
Factors
i
Cognitive Factors
-Executive Function 
-Verbal Ability
I
Environmental
Factors
-social interactions 
and exposure to 
mental state talk
ToM
ability
ToM
use
Emotional
and
Behavioural
problems
Factors specific to the 
situation, e.g. 
Motivation 
-cooperation 
-competition 
Potential gains 
Relationship factors 
Stress, mood
Personality
Empathy
Social Moralisation
Affect Regulation
Social Information 
Processing Biases
The implications of finding out more about ToM use in childhood and the associations 
with emotional and behavioural problems are hugely important and bear relevance for 
working clinically with such children. Assessment approaches, therapy and preventative 
strategies using ToM are implemented clinically, for example Short Term Mentalizing 
and Relational Therapy (SMART; Fearon et al., 2006) and in tackling bullying in 
schools (Twemlow & Fonagy, 2006). Identifying factors which affect this important 
ability may help the development of strategies to improve the lives of many children and 
their families.
1  The diagram depicts how ToM may mediate a relationship between genetic and environmental factors 
and emotional and behavioural difficulties. It is assumed that there are many other factors contributing to 
the development of such problems even though these are not depicted.
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70PART 2
EMPIRICAL PAPER
STRESS, THEORY OF MIND AND EMOTIONAL AND 
BEHAVIOURAL DIFFICULTIES IN PRE-ADOLESCENT
CHILDREN
71Abstract
This study examined the effects of a social stressor on Theory of Mind (ToM) 
performance as mediated by cortisol reactivity. An experimental between groups design 
was used, in which 9-11 year old children were randomly allocated to either a social 
stress (N = 50) or control condition (N = 27). The stress intervention consisted of the 
Trier Social Stress Test for Children (TSST-C; Buske-Kirschbaum, 1997) whilst the 
control intervention involved a series of functionally similar tasks that did not involve 
social stress. Physiological reactivity was measured at two time points (pre and post 
intervention) as indicated by salivary cortisol concentration. ToM performance was 
assessed using the Strange Stories task (from Happe, 1994) and the Eyes Test (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 2001) immediately following the intervention. There were no differences in 
salivary cortisol between the stressed and control groups post-intervention. The salivary 
cortisol means followed diurnal variation in both groups and decreased. No group 
difference in ToM performance was found. However in the stressed group, post- TSST- 
C cortisol was an independent predictor of ToM performance on the Strange Stories 
task. Cortisol reactivity and ToM performance were also examined in relation to 
problem scores on the Child Behaviour Checklist (Achenbach, 2001), but no 
associations were found. The results are discussed within the context of the study’s 
limitations and the potential implications of a relationship between stress and ToM are 
considered. Further research is required investigating the effects of stress on ToM and 
the links to emotional and behavioural difficulties.
72Introduction
Recent research has shown much interest in individual differences in Theory of Mind 
(ToM), the factors which influence these differences and the resulting consequences. In 
addition, research is starting to look at factors which affect the application of ToM in a 
given situation.  Stress is known to affect a variety of cognitive processes and is 
predicted here to affect ToM performance. The rationale for the present study will be 
presented by briefly reviewing ToM literature, the effects of stress on cognition, 
individual differences in stress physiology and how stress and ToM may relate to 
emotional and behavioural difficulties.
Theory of Mind (ToM)
ToM is the understanding of the self and others by reference to mental states (thoughts, 
beliefs and feelings) and is critical in predicting emotions and behaviour (Frith, Morton 
and Leslie, 1991). It is a remarkable and high-level capacity which is automatic and an 
almost exclusively human ability. Classically, the acquisition of ToM is observed 
experimentally in 4 year old children who begin to pass false-belief tasks, for example, 
deceptive container tasks (e.g. Pemer, Leekham & Wimmer, 1987). These tasks 
demonstrate a child’s understanding that someone else may hold a different belief to 
their own or that they themselves may hold different beliefs at different times. The 
development of ToM can, however, be argued to begin well before this age and it clearly 
continues to develop throughout childhood, into adolescence and adulthood. Some 
evidence has been gained that suggests a genetic influence (Hughes & Cutting, 1999), 
although in a larger study Hughes et al. (2005) found a negligible genetic influence on 5- 
year-old’s mentalization skills. Certainly, environmental effects are substantial and it is
73thought that there are bi-directional relationships between social experiences and ToM 
skills (see Hughes & Leekham, 2004 for a review). ToM has been associated with 
attachment security (Fonagy, 2001) and maternal sensitivity to the child’s mental state 
(Meins, Femyhough, Fradley & Tuckey, 2001). Other factors such as number of siblings 
(e.g. Peterson, 2001), cultural differences (e.g. Vinden, 1996) and socio-economic status 
(Hughes et al., 2005) have been associated with variation in ToM. A common factor to 
these environmental influences may be exposure to mental state talk (Symons, 2004). 
ToM development and ability is linked to other cognitive abilities, namely verbal ability 
and executive function. Impairments in ToM have been linked to autism (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1985) and more recently, there has been interest in individual differences in ToM 
and how these may relate to other emotional and behavioural difficulties in children. For 
example, research has been carried out with children with conduct disorder (Happe & 
Frith, 1996), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Charman, Carroll &
Sturge, 2001; Pemer, Kain & Barchfield, 2002; Sodian & Hulsken, 2005), those rejected 
by their peers (e.g. Badenes, Estevan & Bacete, 2000), children with anxiety (e.g.
Cutting & Dunn, 2002) and those involved in bullying (e.g. Sutton, Smith and 
Swettenham, 1999). Some evidence has been gained to suggest that children with 
emotional and behavioural problems may differ in ToM ability and their application of 
it. This is further supported by research with adult clinical populations (e.g. Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2004; Langdon & Coltheart, 1999). However, much research is compromised 
by difficulties intrinsic to measuring ToM skills as experimental ToM tasks may not 
reflect everyday use. ToM is used in the context of relationships, which requires the 
consideration of competition, co-operation and potential gains. It is likely that previous 
experiences, personality factors and empathy all play a considerable role in an
74individual’s use of ToM in any given situation. Some research has been carried out 
looking at intra-individual differences (e.g. O’Conner & Hirsch, 1999) and this is 
thought to be a key area for research so that we can begin to understand more about 
everyday use of ToM (Keenan, 2003).  It is expected that other factors affect an 
individual’s use of ToM at a given time. Stress is a likely candidate for this.
Acute stress, cognition and theory of mind
It is well known that stress is influential in children’s development and can cause both 
immediate and long term effects. It is plausible that chronic stress could affect ToM 
development (see Fonagy, 1999) and that acute stress could affect the application of 
ToM at a given time. Stress is known to affect other cognitive processes; at low levels 
stress can have an enhancing effect on cognition, but greater or uncontrollable stress 
effectively takes the prefrontal cortex (PFC) offline as survival mode takes over 
(Amsten, 1998).
The hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) system is the core neuroendocrine 
system of the stress response and it produces the glucocorticoid hormone cortisol. 
Cortisol mediates a range of basal metabolic and stress-sensitive processes in the body 
(Watamura, Donzella, Kertes, & Gunnar, 2004). HPA reactivity to stress is adaptive; an 
increase in cortisol mobilizes the organism’s resources to meet challenges when needed, 
but a negative feedback loop ensures cortisol down-regulation when challenges have 
been met (Erickson, Drevets, & Schulkin, 2003). The HPA response affects frontal 
processes and is known to affect a variety of cognitive functions. The effects of 
glucocorticoids on cognition follow an inverted U-shaped curve (Lupien & McEwen
751997), and whilst very high levels have an adverse effect on cognition, very low levels 
are also associated with impairments. It follows that a medium level of glucocorticoids 
result in optimum performance, hence a moderate increase in cortisol has an enhancing 
effect on cognitive processes.
The effect of stress on executive function (EF) is of particular interest as ToM and EF 
are empirically linked. Two studies have looked at the relationship between cortisol 
levels and EF in children, and both studies found that higher cortisol levels were 
associated with better EF performance (Blair, Granger & Razza, 2005; Davis, Bruce & 
Gunner, 2003). However, large increases in cortisol have been shown to impair EF in 
animal studies and in pharmacological studies with adults. For example, the 
experimental administration of exogenous glucocorticoids has been found to interfere 
with frontal process such as inhibitory control, attention regulation and planning 
(Young, Sahakian, Robbins & Cowen, 1999). Psychological stress has been shown to 
impair attentional inhibition in adults (Skosnik, Chatterton, Swisher & Park, 2000). 
Although, Skosnik et al. (2000) did not find a group increase in cortisol levels after a 
stressor, they found that cortisol levels after the stressor were associated with attentional 
inhibition. Additionally, the effects of stress on memory retrieval, a related cognitive 
process, have been researched much more intensely and it has been shown that induced 
stress can raise cortisol levels and have an adverse effect on memory retrieval (e.g. 
Kuhlmann, Piel & Wolf, 2005). Furthermore, teacher ratings of inattention in children 
with ADHD have been associated with noradrenaline, another marker of stress 
(Anderson et al., 2000).
76The effect of stress on social cognition has been given less attention and only one study 
has looked at the effect of stress on ToM. Blair et al. (2005) looked at the effects of 
cortisol reactivity on EF and ToM in four and five year old children. A moderate 
increase in cortisol was positively associated with measures of EF and self-regulation, 
but not with emotion knowledge or false-belief understanding. Further research is 
warranted using more advanced measures of ToM, capable of detecting individual 
differences as false-belief tasks can only be scored as right or wrong. Good examples of 
ToM tasks that yield a range of scores are the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, 2001) and the 
Strange Stories (Happe, 1994). In addition, stress was induced by the child working with 
an unknown adult and it may be advantageous to use a more robust stress induction 
procedure.
One reason to expect an effect of stress on ToM performance is that there are empirical 
links between ToM and EF (e.g. Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses & Claxton, 
2003; Ozonoff et al., 1991). Indeed, there is a developmental shift in both ToM and EF 
around 4 years of age and at this age ToM and EF are correlated (Hughes, 1998). 
Opposing theories have suggested that executive control is necessary for ToM and that 
ToM is necessary for executive control. It has also been suggested that there is 
interdependency between the two skills (see Pemer & Lang, 1999, for a review). There 
is evidence that stress can enhance or impair executive function and it is hypothesised 
that there will be a similar effect on ToM. However, it should be noted that there is some 
evidence that suggests dissociability between ToM and EF in children with ADHD (e.g. 
Pemer & Lang, 2002) and those who are deaf (see Peterson, 2003). Therefore, it is 
possible that stress could affect EF and ToM independently.A second reason to expect an effect of stress on ToM performance comes from literature 
on mentalization, a term which can be used interchangeably with ToM. Relationships 
between affect regulation, capacity to maintain focused attention and understanding 
mental states in one’s self and others, are argued to be central features for working 
‘closely and collaboratively with other minds’ (Fonagy and Target, 2002). It is argued 
by these authors that stress and the ability to regulate emotions have consequences for 
mentalization ability. Mentalization is said to act as a ‘buffer’ when other’s reactions are 
unexpected, allowing auxiliary hypotheses to be created as a way of explaining 
behaviour. It is hypothesised that under stress the ability to make these hypotheses fails, 
hence implicating the impairment of mentalization type processes (Fonagy, 1999).
It may be that acute stress affects ToM/ mentalization due to compromised EF abilities, 
for example attention control or it is possible that this occurs through a domain specific 
mechanism. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (£MRI) studies are starting to 
isolate specific brain areas involved in ToM. Many studies have consistently found 
activation of the anterior paracingulate cortex, the superior temporal sulci and the 
temporal poles bilaterally during tasks of theory of mind (see Gallagher & Frith, 2003). 
Recently, Vollm et al. (2005) found activation in the medial prefrontal cortex, 
temporoparietal junction and temporal poles to be common to both ToM and empathy. 
They also found increased activation for ToM stimuli, compared to empathy stimuli in 
the lateral orbitofrontal cortex, middle frontal gyrus, cuneus and superior temporal 
gyrus. Many of these areas are likely to be stress sensitive; the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is 
often described as being ‘offline’ in times of stress (e.g. Amsten, 1998) and
78glucocorticoids affect the functioning of the PFC, including the anterior cingulate cortex 
(e.g. Karreman & Mogahaddam, 1996).
Early experiences, chronic stress and stress physiology
A number of studies have shown individual differences in cortisol levels and cortisol 
reactivity. It seems that early experiences may influence these differences. For example, 
sensitive and responsive care-giving in which a child is helped to regulate emotions and 
stress will result in HPA development which responds to stress appropriately and which 
is able to regulate itself efficiently. For example, it has been shown that children with 
secure attachments have lower cortisol reactivity to a novel situation (e.g. Van Bakel & 
Riksen-Walraven, 2004). In contrast, hyper- or hypo- cortisol activity have been 
documented in a variety of high-risk and clinical populations, including those who have 
suffered maltreatment, post traumatic stress disorder and institutional rearing (Gunnar & 
Donzella, 2002). Chronic activation of the HPA axis has been shown to adversely affect 
the development of brain structures and neural systems known to be important for the 
regulation of the stress response (Francis, Caldji, Champagne, Plotsky, & Meaney,
1999). For reasons that are not well understood, the resulting effect can be either very 
high or very low levels of cortisol.
Those with higher cortisol levels and reactivity are likely to be more vulnerable to the 
effects of stress on cognition. Indeed, Fonagy (2006, pp. 87) suggested that individuals 
who have suffered from trauma or abuse have lower thresholds for the switching off of 
mentalization due to stress. It is also possible that those with lower cortisol levels and 
hypo- reactivity will not benefit from the positive effects of mild stress on cognition.
79Links to emotional and behavioural difficulties
As discussed previously, there are theoretical and some empirical links between ToM 
and emotional and behavioural difficulties. There are also theoretical and empirical links 
between stress and emotional and behavioural difficulties. Indeed, chronically elevated 
stress levels are known to be associated with problems of physical and mental health 
(McEwen, 1998). Prolonged elevation of cortisol levels can cause low mood, depression, 
and cognitive impairment (Schmidt, Fox, Goldberg, Smith & Schulkin, 1999;
Wolkowitz et al., 1990). Robust findings indicate elevated HPA axis in adults with 
depression and this has also been found in children (Luby et al., 2003). Similar results 
have been found in other clinical populations, for example adolescents with conduct 
disorder (McBumett, Lahey, Rathouz & Loeber, 2000). However, less is known about 
how these three variables relate together. Does ToM play a mediating role between 
stress and emotional and behavioural difficulties?
Stress, ToM and emotional and behavioural difficulties
There are theoretical and empirical grounds to hypothesise that ToM function may be 
affected by physiological arousal and stress. Therefore, this study investigated the 
effects of a social stressor on ToM performance. An adapted version of The Trier Social 
Stress Test for Children (TSST-C; Buske-Kirschbaum, 1997) was used in order to 
induce a stress response in a group of children. The TSST-C has been shown to induce 
physiological stress responses in children, including an increase in salivary free cortisol 
(Buske-Kirschbaum et al., 1997; Buske-Kirschbaum et al., 2003; Dorn et al., 2003; 
Kudielka, Buske-Kirschbaum, Hellhammer & Kirschbaum, 2003). Salivary cortisol 
levels within the stressed group and performance on two ToM tasks immediately
80following the stressor are compared to a control group. To the authors knowledge, a 
between groups design using the TSST-C and a control group has not been carried out 
before. Additionally, individual differences in cortisol levels following the stressor are 
analysed in relation to ToM performance in the stressed group.
Hypotheses
It is predicted that the TSST-C will negatively affect performance on the ToM tasks. 
This is consistent with theory from the mentalisation literature which indicates that 
stress impairs mentalisation (Fonagy, 1999). It is also based upon empirical evidence 
that psychosocial stress can affect cortisol levels in association with impairment in 
frontal processes (e.g. Kuhlmann et al., 2005; Skosnik et al., 2000). It is therefore 
hypothesised that:
1.  There will be a significant difference in ToM performance between a stressed 
group and a control group. It is predicted that the stressed group will not perform 
as well on the ToM tasks as the controls.
2.  Stress reactivity (as measured by salivary cortisol) will be correlated with 
performance on the ToM tasks. It is predicted that higher cortisol levels after the 
stressor will be associated with lower ToM scores.
However, it is worth noting that the direction of the effect on ToM performance is 
contingent on the levels of the stressor. Based on the inverted U-shaped curve, it is 
conceivable that the effect may be in the opposite direction and that small increases in 
cortisol levels may be associated with higher ToM scores.The relationship between stress reactivity, ToM performance and emotional and 
behavioural difficulties is also investigated. Investigation of these hypotheses is 
exploratory as there is not conclusive evidence to support predictions. It is hypothesised 
that ToM performance is affected by stress and that ToM performance mediates a 
relationship between stress reactivity and emotional and behavioural difficulties. It is 
therefore hypothesised that:
3.  Stress reactivity (as measured by salivary cortisol) will be related to emotional 
and behavioural difficulties.
4.  Performance on the ToM tasks will be related to ratings of emotional and 
behavioural difficulties.
5.  ToM performance will mediate the relationship between stress reactivity and 
emotional and behavioural difficulties (this will depend upon the relationships in 
hypotheses 3 and 4 being found).
Method
Overview
A stress response was induced in 50 children using an adapted version of the TSST-C, 
(Buske-Kirschbaum et al., 1997) and was measured by cortisol determination of saliva 
samples (-pre and -post TSST-C) and subjective rating (Visual Analogue Scale; VAS). 
ToM performance during the experimental manipulation was measured using the 
Strange Stories (Happe, 1994) and the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, 2001). A control group 
of 27 children was used. Demographics were collected and parents completed the Child
82Behaviour Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach, 2001). The research was carried out as part of 
a joint project (see Fairbaim, J. Stress, cortisol and executive function in pre-adolescent 
school children).
Participants
772 (44 female and 33 male) children were recruited from nine inner city London 
primary schools. All children in Year 5 (a total of 379) from these schools were invited 
to take part and a short presentation was made to each class. All children taking part in 
the research were entered into a raffle to win a family cinema ticket. The mean age of 
the participants was 10 years and 1  month (range: 9; 4 -  11; 1). Demographic 
information was returned by 66 of the children and, for the majority was completed by 
mothers (82%). Of the children who returned forms, 67% (N = 44) lived with at least 
two adults and 79% (N = 52) lived with at least one sibling. Fifty two respondents 
completed information about household income: 36.5% (N = 19) of families reported an 
income of less than £10,000 per annum, 50% (N = 26) reported between £10,000- 
£40,000 and 13.5% (N = 17) reported more than £40,000. 29.5% (N = 18) respondents 
reported being unemployed, 37.7% (N = 23) reported one adult in the household being 
employed and 32.8% (N = 20) reported two adults being employed. The ethnicities of 
the participants are shown in Table 1.
2  In terms of statistical power: Kuhlman et al. (2005) found a significant difference in cortisol levels 
between conditions (TSST and control) in a repeated measures design with 19 participants. It was decided 
that this should be the minimum number in each group. Few studies are relevant when considering 
correlational analyses between cortisol levels and ToM in die stressed group, however Skosnik et al. 
(2000) found a correlation of .47 between cortisol levels 20 minutes after a stressor and attentional 
inhibition. Therefore a medium to large effect size was expected and this study was designed to detect an 
effect size of .4 and above with 80% power at alpha = .05; this required 51 participants in the stressed 
group.
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The ethnicity of participants
Ethnicity N (%)
White UK 19 (24.7%)
White other 5 (6.5%)
Black or Black British -  Caribbean 6 (7.8%)
Black or Black British -  African 7 (9.1%)
Asian or Asian British -  Indian 1  (1.3%)
Asian or Asian British -  Bangladeshi 15 (19.5%)
Asian or Asian British -  other 3 (3.9%)
Mixed 7 (9.1%)
Other 2 (2.6%)
Missing data 12(15.6%)
The children were randomly allocated to either the stressed or control group by the 
researchers who were blind to information about them. Two children were dispatched by 
their teacher at any given time and they were consecutively allocated to either the 
stressed or control condition. In order to maintain a 2:1 ratio (of stressed: control 
participants), a cycle was used: two stressed conditions followed by two sets of one 
stressed and one control condition. The mean age and gender for each group is shown in 
Table 2.
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Age and gender of participants in each group
Stressed
N Mean age 
(years; months)
Control
N Mean age 
(years; months)
Males 23 10; 2 10 10; 1
Females 27 10; 0 17 10; 1
Total 50 10; 1 27 10; 1
Ethics
Ethical approval was gained from UCL Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix B). 
Informed consent was gained from the children and their parents/ guardians (see 
Appendix C). The ethical concern about inducing a stress response was considered 
throughout testing. At the beginning of the testing session, the children were reminded 
that some tasks would be difficult and they were asked if they still wanted to take part. 
They were informed that they could withdraw from the study at any time. During the 
testing session, the children’s reported stress was closely monitored using a visual 
analogue scale. After large increases in stress, the children were asked if they still 
wanted to carry on. The children were debriefed at the end, given specific praise about 
what they had done well and invited to play a fim game before returning to class.
85Design
A between groups design was used. The two groups were stressed (N = 50) and control 
(N = 27). A larger proportion of children were assigned to the stressed group so that 
regression analysis could be carried out within this group.
Measures
Theory of  mind  performance :
1.  The Strange Stories
A revised version of the Strange Stories test (Happe, 1994; Happe, Winner & Brownell, 
1999; Brent, Rios, Happe & Charman, 2004) was used. The test consisted of eight 
theory of mind (ToM) stories and five physical control (PC) stories. The ToM stories 
assessed participant’s understanding of lies, white lies, double bluff, persuasion and 
misunderstanding. Correct performance required the ability to identify the underlying 
intention of the character. The PC stories assessed the participant’s understanding of a 
physical or practical reason for a character’s behaviour. The PC stories were included so 
that non-ToM task performance of the SS-ToM stories, for example verbal competence, 
could be controlled for during analysis. Each story and question was read aloud to the 
participant and the story sheet was left in front of them to minimise memory loading (see 
Appendix D for verbal instructions). The order of presentation was counterbalanced; 
either the PC or ToM stories were read first. Each child’s answers were recorded 
verbatim at the time of testing. The stories were rated on a 0 - 2 point scale as full and 
explicitly correct (2), partial or implicitly correct (1), or incorrect (0) according to 
criteria used in previous research. (For examples of stories, answers and scoring see 
Appendix E). A subset of 15 answer sheets were rated by a second rater. Kendall’s Taucorrelation coefficients were calculated for each question. The range of co-efficients for 
10 of the stories was .76-1.00. For three of the stories there was not enough variance to 
compute reliability, but overall Pearson’s r correlation coefficients for the calculated 
total scores of the  PC stories (.87) and ToM stories (.79) was considered satisfactory.
2.  The Eyes Test
A version of the Eyes Test for children and adolescents (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) was 
used which has normative data for children between 6-12 years old (Baron-Cohen, 
Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997). It consists of black and white photographs of 
male’s and female’s eyes. Participants were required to choose out of four options which 
word best describes what the person in each photograph is thinking or feeling (for 
example, hate, surprised, kind or cross). (See Appendix D for verbal instructions and 
Appendix F for an example). There is one practice item and 28 test items. Correct 
answers are scored as 1  and the maximum score is 28.
Brent et al. (2004) found significant differences, with large effect sizes, between 
typically developing children and children with autistic spectrum disorder on the SS- 
ToM and Eyes Test, but not the SS-PC. Gender differences have also been found on 
versions of the Eyes Test, with males typically scoring lower then females (e.g. Baron- 
Cohen, Joliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997).
Child Behaviour Checklist (CBCL)
The CBCL is a questionnaire designed to quantify children's problems and competencies 
in a standardized way (Achenbach, 2001). The CBCL rated by parents for 6-18 year olds
87was used. Parents were asked to complete items relating to problem behaviours, 
indicating whether and how often a specific behavior has occurred on a 3-point scale (0- 
2). Factor analysis has derived syndrome scales and second factor analysis has grouped 
these scales together into broader bands, labelled ‘Internalising’ {anxious/ depressed, 
withdrawn/depressed and somatic complaints) and ‘Externalising’ {rule-breaking 
behaviour and aggressive behaviour). Internalising, externalising and total problem 
scores were computed and converted into T-scores using an Assessment Data 
Management Program (Achenbach, 2003). Normative data are available for the various 
syndrome scores, separately for boys and girls at ages 6-11. The reliability and validity 
of the parent version of the CBCL have been demonstrated in many studies in North 
America and other cultures (see Achenbach, 2001).
SAT score for reading
Current Standardised Assessment Test (SAT) scores of reading ability were obtained 
from the teacher of each child. Optional SATs and teacher assessments are undertaken 
routinely throughout Key Stage 2, including Year 5. Children’s attainment is assessed 
and monitored using SAT scores. The majority of children in Key Stage 2 are expected 
to work at levels 2 -  5; by age 11 (the end of Key Stage 2) children are expected to reach 
level 4 (National Curriculum Online, 2007). Within each level there are three bands that 
ascend c, b, a. Participants scores ranged from la to 5b and the median score was 4c. For 
analysis, these scores were converted to a numerical scale ranging from 1-15.
88Cortisol determination
Participants used a polypropylene straw and ultra pure polypropylene Salicap® to 
produce two samples of saliva. These samples were frozen (below -20°C) and then sent 
to IBL Hamburg where competitive chemiluminescence immunoassay (ILA) was used 
to determine cortisol levels. This was measured in ug/dL. IBL-Hamburg cortisol in 
saliva ILA has high analytical sensitivity (0.16 ng/mL), good specificity, precision and 
linearity (IBL Hamburg, 2006).
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS)
Participants rated their mood on a 10 point VAS at five time points during the procedure 
(see Appendix G). On the scale, 1  was labelled as ‘Very calm and relaxed’ (and was 
depicted with a smiley face) and 10 was labelled ‘Very stressed and not at all relaxed’ 
(and was depicted with a worried face).
Procedure
The children were randomly assigned to the stressed or control group and to one of two 
researchers. Each child was seen for approximately one hour. All testing sessions were 
carried out in the afternoon due to diurnal variation in cortisol; it was planned for the 
sessions to start at 13.15 and 14.15. Due to factors outside of the author’s control this 
was not always possible, but all subjects started testing between 13.00 - 13.30 or 14.00 - 
14.30.  Typically, two children took part at the same time (one with each researcher). 
They were collected from their classroom or playground and asked to have a sip of 
water.
89After a brief introduction, the children were asked to spit some saliva into the Salicap® 
(Pre-TSST-C cortisol level) and to rate their mood (VAS Time 1).
An adapted version of the TSST-C (Buske-Kirschbaum et al., 1997) was given to the 
stressed group. A recent meta-analysis (Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004) identified that 
social-evaluative threat in combination with uncontrollability is associated with the 
largest cortisol increases in laboratory experiments. The TSST-C is designed to 
incorporate both of these factors. The test involves telling a story and mental arithmetic 
in front of adults. The test was adapted by shortening it, only one adult witnessed the 
child’s performance, no video equipment was used and an anticipatory stressor was also 
included. Recently, HPA activation has been shown to correlate with anticipatory stress 
appraisal (Gaab, Rohleder, Nater & Ehlert, 2005) and this was included to maintain 
physiological arousal during the procedure. To the author’s knowledge, the TSST-C has 
not been used before in a between group design, alongside a control group although the 
adult version of the test has been conducted using a repeated measures design (e.g. 
Kuhlman, Piel & Wolf, 2005). A protocol was designed to keep the procedures for the 
stressed and control group very similar, the difference being the influence of social 
stress on the experimental group. The control group completed the same tasks, but did 
not have to perform these tasks in front of the researcher. In addition, they were not 
given the anticipatory stressor.
A description of the procedure is given here (see Appendix D for a transcript). The 
researcher informed the children that they should listen carefully to a story so that they
90could make up an ending for it. In the stressed group it was emphasised that this would 
be in front of the researcher, that the child would need to stand up and that the story had 
to be really good and ‘better than the other children’s’. In contrast, the children in the 
control group were told that they would need to think about their story, but would not 
need to tell the researcher at all. The stressed group were given two minutes to prepare 
their story, whilst the control group were asked to think about their story in this time.
The stressed group were then asked to stand up and tell their story out loud. They were 
asked to keep telling their story for three minutes and were prompted to continue if they 
stopped at any time. In contrast, the control group was asked to draw or write down 
some of their story, but were told that the researcher would not be looking at their work. 
Immediately afterwards both groups were asked to do some mental arithmetic for three 
minutes, counting backwards from 758 in 7’s; a task recommended for children aged 
between 9 to 11 years (Buske-Kirschbaum et al., 1997). The stressed group were told to 
remain standing and were asked to complete the arithmetic out loud, as fast and as 
accurately as possible. On every mistake they were asked to start again. The control 
group were told that it was another thinking task, for them to do inside their heads and 
that they would not need to share their answers. When the task finished the children in 
the stressed group were told that they should not forget their story and that they would 
be asked some more about their story, or asked to do some more maths at the end of the 
testing session. They were reminded of this between each of the following ToM and EF 
tasks. Both groups of children were asked to rate their mood (VAS Time 2).
The children then completed the two ToM tasks and an EF task (not reported here). The 
order of presentation of the tasks was counterbalanced within the stressed and control
91groups and between researchers within each group. Twenty minutes after the end of the 
TSST-C (usually between the second and third task) the child was asked for a second 
saliva sample and to rate their mood (VAS Time 3). Previous research shows that it 
takes approximately twenty minutes for cortisol levels to peak post-stressor (e.g. Buske- 
Kirschbaum et al., 2003). They then continued with the tasks.
After all three tasks had been completed, the child was asked to rate how they were 
feeling (VAS Time 4). Children in the stressed group were asked if they would like to 
say anything else about their story. They were then told that they would not be asked any 
further questions about their story or any further maths. All the children were praised for 
their efforts and it was acknowledged that some of the tasks were supposed to be hard. 
Every child was given an example of something they did well. The children were then 
invited to play a short game, before returning to class. After this game, the children rated 
their mood (VAS Time 5) to ensure that they were not left feeling distressed. Further 
praise and thanks were given to the children and they were given the opportunity to ask 
any questions.
Data Analysis
ANOVAs and t-tests were used to look at group differences in salivary cortisol and 
performance on the ToM tasks. In order to examine individual differences, correlations 
were carried out between the measures of cortisol and performance on the ToM tasks in 
the stressed group only and followed up where applicable using regression analysis. To 
test the hypotheses that emotional and behavioural difficulties would be associated with 
both cortisol and ToM, correlations were performed. It was also hypothesised that ToM
92would mediate a relationship between stress and emotional and behavioural difficulties. 
For this to be the case there would need to be a significant effect of cortisol on problem 
scores and ToM would need to act as a mediator, adding significant independent 
variance to that already accounted for by the cortisol variables (Baron & Kenny, 1986), 
hence it was anticipated that regression analysis would be carried out if the relevant, 
significant correlations were found.
Results
Overview
Prior to analysis of the data, information on missing data and normality of the variables 
is included. Before investigating group differences in ToM performance, the groups are 
examined in terms of demographics, salivary cortisol (pre-TSST-C and post-TSST-C) 
and subjective ratings of stress (VAS). The descriptive data for the ToM tasks are then 
presented and group differences are analysed. In order to investigate individual 
differences in the stressed group, correlations and regression analyses are carried out. 
Finally, data from the CBCL problem scales are presented and the ability to predict these 
scores from salivary cortisol and ToM performance in the stressed group is investigated.
Missing data
Data are missing for Strange Stories -  physical condition (1 participant), CBCL scores 
(18 participants), ethnicity (12 participants), income (25 participants) and SAT score (1 
participant).
93Data screening
The data were inspected for normality and outliers before any analysis proceeded. Tests 
of skew and kurtosis indicated that the cortisol data and Eyes data (control group only) 
were not normally distributed. The cortisol data both pre- and post- TSST-C were 
positively skewed in both the stressed and control groups and so a square root 
transformation was applied. For one case in the stressed group, the transformed post- 
TSST-C data was 4.37 standard deviations from the mean and when a ‘change in 
cortisol’ variable was created, this case had a value that was 4.02 standard deviations 
from the mean. There was no clear cut strategy for reducing the data for this case and so 
the cortisol data for this case was removed. The Eyes data had an outlier in the control 
group (z = 3.39) and this was reduced to within one unit of the nearest value. The 
transformed data were used for analysis using parametric tests.
Preliminary analysis
A preliminary analysis of the two groups was carried out to determine if there were any 
confounding differences between the two groups prior to looking at differences in 
cortisol, ToM scores and CBCL scores. The two groups, stressed and control, were not 
significantly different in terms of SAT scores, age, gender, ethnicity or income (see 
Table 3).
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Descriptive statistics for the stressed and control groups
Stressed 
Mean (SD)
Control 
Mean (SD)
SATs (N = 76) 9.72 (2.34) 9.46 (2.45) t(73) = .45, p = .65
Age (N = 77) 121.38(4.23) 120.85 (4.59) 1(75) = -51, p = .61
N N
Gender (N = 77)
-males 23 10 X2(i) = .58, p = .45
-females 27 17
Ethnicity (N = 65)
-white 17 7 X2(i) = .98, p = .32
-non-white 24 17
Income (N = 52)
-<£2 0 ,0 0 0 18 11 X2(i) = .16, p = .69
->£2 0 ,0 0 0 13 10
The two groups showed differences in their subjective ratings of stress during the 
procedure. Figure 1  shows the estimated marginal means as measured by the VAS. A 
repeated measures ANOVA looking at the 5 time points showed a main effect of time 
(F(i,75)= 13.30, p < .01), group (F(i,75)= 6.98, p = .01) and a significant interaction (F(ijs) 
= 19.96, p < .01). Post hoc analysis showed that there was a main effect of time in both 
groups.
95Figure 1
VAS ratings throughout the testing sessions
a   4
Is
CO
<
>  2
♦
2  3  4  5
Time Points
—■ —  Stressed 
♦  Control
However, in the control group there were no significant difference between times 1  and
2 whereas in the stressed group there was; VAS rating at time 2 (x = 4.94) was 
significantly higher than at time 1  (x = 3.10). Times 1  and 2 are of particular interest as 
they show subjective ratings of stress before and immediately after the TSST-C.
Pairwise comparisons, using Bonferroni adjustments, indicated significant differences 
between the groups at time 2 (F(i5 74) = 20.35, p < .01) and time 3 (F(i>  74) = 4.57, p = .04), 
but not at time 1  (F(is  74) =  .28, p = .60), time 4 (F(i, 74) = .38, p = .54) and time 5 (F(i, 74) = 
1.06, p = .31).
Analysis of salivary cortisol
The transformed cortisol data were then analysed to determine if there were any 
differences between the two groups, in other words to determine if there was a group
96effect of the TSST-C.  Descriptive data for the non-transformed salivary cortisol data are 
shown in Table 4. A repeated measures ANOVA showed a main effect of time (pre- vs 
post- TSST-C) (F(i, 74) = 4.93, p = .03); cortisol levels were greater pre-TSST-C (x = .25) 
than post-TSST-C (x = .22). There was no significant difference between the stressed 
and control groups (F(is  74) = . 11, p = .75) and no interaction with time point (F(i, 74) = 
1.12, p = .29).
Table 4
Descriptive statistics for original salivary cortisol data in the stressed and control 
groups.
Stressed Mean (SD) Control Mean (SD)
(N = 49) (N = 27)
Pre-TSST-C Cortisol (pg/dL) .24 (.13) .26 (.12)
Post-TSST-C Cortisol (pg/dL) .23 (.13) .21 (.09)
The potential influences of demographic variables were then examined. A series of 
repeated measures ANOVAs showed that there were no significant interacting effects 
with time or group of the following dichotomous variables: gender, ethnicity (white and 
non-white), income (below £20,000 and above £20,000) or hour of testing (1 O’Clock 
and 2 O’Clock). However, a main effect of hour of testing was found (F(i, 72) =11.82, p 
< 0.01); the 2 O’Clock group (x = .42) had lower mean cortisol than the 1  O’Clock 
group (x = .50). An interaction was found between which researcher conducted the 
session and time (F(i, 72) = 4.76, p = .03), indicating that there was a steeper decline 
overall in cortisol of participants working with one researcher. Age was also entered as acovariate and a significant interaction with time was found (F(is  73)= 5.71, p = .02). This 
suggested that younger participants did not have as large a decrease in cortisol levels as 
older participants did. In fact there was a three way interaction between time point, age 
and group (F(ij2)= 6.53, p = .01) and this indicated that younger children in the stressed 
group had higher cortisol levels at post-TSST-C measure, but not in the control group. 
This indicates that the stressed condition was more effective at inducing stress in 
younger children than in the older children.
No significant correlations were found between the VAS ratings and cortisol data (pre- 
TSST-C, post-TSST-C and percentage change) in the stressed group or the control 
group.
Investigation of  group differences in theory of mind performance
In order to test the hypothesis that stress affects ToM performance, group differences in 
ToM were investigated. The mean scores and standard deviations are given for total 
scores of the Strange Stories -  physical control (SS-PC), Strange Stories -  Theory of 
Mind (SS-ToM) and the Eyes Test in Table 5.
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Descriptive statistics for ToM measures
Stressed Mean (SD) Control Mean (SD)
I
I
o (N = 27)
Eyes (max = 28) 17.96 (2.72) 17.59(2.10)
SS -  PCa (max = 10) 5.26(2.19) 5.46(1.79)
SS -  ToM6 (max =16) 11.70(2.27) 11.56 (2.67)°
a SS-PC -  Strange Stories Physical Control score
b SS-ToM -  Strange Stories Theory of Mind score 
CN = 26
Using independent samples t-tests, no significant group differences were found for SS- 
PC (t(74) = -.40, p = .69), SS-ToM (t< 75) = .25, p = .80) or Eyes (t< 75) = .61, p = .54). 
Percentage correct scores were calculated for both SS story types. A repeated measures 
ANOVA indicated an effect of story type (F(i> 7 4 ) = 71.15, p < .01). Mean percentage 
correct on the PC stories was lower (53.6%) than the ToM stories (72.7%). However, 
there was no interaction of this with group (F(i j 4)= .38, p = .54).
The order of presentation of the tasks was examined in order to determine if this had an 
effect on performance. Two way ANOVAs looking at the effect of order of presentation 
and group showed no significant differences for the Eyes, SS-ToM or SS-PC tasks and 
no interactions.
99A series of univariate analyses of variance looking separately at Eyes, SS-ToM and SS- 
PC showed that there were no significant main or interacting effects of gender, ethnicity, 
income or researcher. An effect of hour of testing was found on SS-PC scores (F(ij2)= 
5.35, p = .02). Those being tested at 1  O’Clock (x = 5.69) tended to perform higher on 
this task than those tested at 2 O’Clock (x = 4.71). Hour of testing had an interacting 
effect with group on SS-ToM (F(ij3) = 4.30, p = .04). Simple main effects showed that 
the control group performed significantly worse in the 2 O’Clock testing slot (x = 10.33) 
than in the 1  O’Clock testing slot (x = 12.53), but there was no significant difference in 
the stressed group.
Predicting ToM performance in the stressed group
The heterogeneity of the cortisol responses after the TSST-C are of interest, even though 
a significant mean group difference in cortisol levels between the stressed and control 
group was not found. Potential relationships between cortisol levels and ToM 
performance were therefore investigated within the stressed group. Pearson r 
correlations were carried out between the measures of ToM, cortisol, age, and SAT 
scores and are presented in Table 6 for descriptive purposes. It should be noted that 
significant results should be interpreted with caution as the probability of Type 1  errors 
is higher when many correlations are carried out.
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Correlations among variables in the stressed group
SS-ToMb SS-PC3 Eyes Age SATS  Pre-TSST- 
C cortisol
SS-PC3 .51**
Eyes total .29* .02
Age .09 .28 -.08
SATS .2 0 .45** .1 0 .14
Pre-TSST-C cortisol -.15 .03 .0 0 .29* -.08
Post-TSST-C cortisol -.32* .08 .0 2 -.18 .15  .48**
*  significant at p = 0.05 
** significant at p = 0.01 
3 SS-PC -  Strange Stories Physical Control score 
b SS-ToM -  Strange Stories Theory of Mind score
It should be noted that the correlation between SS-ToM and post-TSST-C cortisol (see 
Table 6) is increased when SS-PC is controlled for in a partial correlation (r = -.41, p < 
.01). This may represent more clearly the association between post-TSST-C and the 
mentalizing component of the Strange Stories task.
In order to investigate the relationship between SS-ToM and salivary cortisol further, 
regression analysis was carried out, controlling for SS-PC, SAT score and hour of 
testing. Overall, the regression was significant (F(5,47) = 4.91, p < .01). Pre-TSST-C 
cortisol, post-TSST-C cortisol, SS-PC, SAT score and hour of testing accounted for
10136.9% of the variance in SS-ToM scores (see Table 7). The independent effect of post- 
TSST-C cortisol was significant; it was indicated that lower cortisol post-TSST-C was 
associated with higher SS-ToM scores (P = -.42, p = .01).
Table 7
Regression equation predicting SS-ToM scores (n = 47), R2 = .37
B SE P
Pre-TSST-C cortisol .69 2.58 .04
Post-TSST-C cortisol -7.05** 2.48 -.42
SS-PC .48** .14 .48
SAT score .04 .13 .04
Hour of testing -.26 .62 -.06
** significant at p < .01
Predicting CBCL problem scores from salivary cortisol and ToM performance
It was hypothesised that ToM would be related to problem behaviour scores and that 
furthermore, ToM would mediate a relationship between salivary cortisol and problem 
behaviour scores. Prior to testing these hypotheses, the mean scores and standard 
deviations for computed T scores for the CBCL problem scales in both the stressed and 
control groups are shown in Table 8. It should be noted that there were no significant 
group differences (as expected; participants were randomly allocated to the groups).
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Descriptive data for problem scores
Stressed Mean (SD) Control Mean (SD)
(N = 39) (N = 20)
Internalising (T score) 52.92(11.66) 56.75(10.19)
Externalising (T score) 51.00(11.34) 52.75 (10.22)
Total (T score) 51.36( 11.37) 55.90 (10.06)
The relationship between baseline salivary cortisol and problem behaviour scores was 
then examined. With the hour of testing controlled for, partial correlations (N = 59) 
indicated a trend between pre-TSST-C cortisol and internalising problems (r = -.23, p = 
.09), and pre-TSST-C and externalising problems (r = -.23, p = .08) problem scores, 
although neither was a significant correlation at p < .05.
In order to test the hypotheses considering the relationships between emotional and 
behavioural difficulties, cortisol reactivity and ToM, data from the stressed group were 
examined. Within this group, no significant gender differences were found for either of 
the problem scores. The correlations between the problem scores, salivary cortisol, ToM 
performance, age and SAT scores are presented in Table 9. The analyses are exploratory 
and caution should be taken in interpreting significant findings when many correlations 
are carried out. Significant correlations were not found between cortisol and emotional 
and behavioural difficulties or between ToM and emotional and behavioural difficulties. 
It was hypothesised that ToM would mediate a relationship between stress and
103emotional and behavioural difficulties. However, as significant correlations were not 
found between problem scores, cortisol and ToM, further analysis was not warranted.
Table 9
Correlations between problem scores and other variables in the stressed group (n -  39)
Internalising Externalising Total
Pre-TSST-C cortisol -.25 -.2 0 -.24
Post-TSST-C cortisol -.09 -.27 -.21
SS-ToMb -.03 -.05 -.04
SS-PC8 -.35* -.31 -.38*
Eyes -.03 -.06 -.1 0
Age -.11 -.17 -.25
SATS -.29 -.21 -.31
Internalising .63** .84**
Externalising 8 9**
*  significant at p = 0.05 
** significant at p = 0.01 
a SS-PC -  Strange Stories Physical Control score 
b SS-ToM -  Strange Stories Theory of Mind score
Discussion
This is the first experimental design, to the author’s knowledge, to look at group 
differences in ToM performance in children exposed to a social stressor and controls, 
with examination of the underlying physiology of the stress response. The primary aim
104was to investigate whether social stress affects ToM performance. It was hypothesised 
that the effects of stress on ToM would be mediated by activation of the HPA axis (as 
measured by an increase in salivary cortisol). Therefore, it was hypothesised that the 
social stressor would create a group difference in salivary cortisol and ToM 
performance. It was also considered that social stress may affect ToM independently of 
cortisol levels.
There was not a significant difference in cortisol levels between a group exposed to the 
adapted version of the TSST-C and controls. There are several hypotheses which could 
explain this: the adapted TSST-C was not stressful enough, the control condition was 
stressful andI or the statistical tests lacked the power to find a difference between the 
two groups. In terms of power, it may have been beneficial to have a larger number of 
participants in the control group. However, it should be noted that Kuhlmann et al. 
(2005) found a significant difference in salivary cortisol between conditions (TSST and 
control) in a within subject design with 19 adults.
A significant group difference in ToM performance was not found on either the Strange 
Stories or Eyes Test. This result may not be surprising given that a significant group 
difference in salivary cortisol was not found. It also indicates that the social stressor did 
not significantly impair performance indirectly either (i.e. independently of cortisol).
One possible conclusion from these results is that social stress does not affect ToM. 
However, a number of limitations need to be taken into account before interpreting the 
finding. Firstly, the groups may not have performed differently on the ToM tasks 
because they did not differ in terms of physiological stress. Importantly, the stressed
105condition may not have been physiologically stressful enough to induce changes in 
cognitive performance. Secondly, the measures of ToM may not have been sensitive 
enough to detect a difference and thirdly, the sample size may not have been big enough 
to detect a group difference.
It is possible that the TSST-C was not physiologically stressful enough. Indeed, the 
mean salivary cortisol level in the stressed group did not increase after the stress, but 
followed diurnal variation and decreased. Mean increases in salivary cortisol have been 
observed in other studies using the TSST-C (e.g. Kudielka, Buske-Kirschbaum, 
Hellhamer & Kirschbaum, 2003; Buske-Kirschbaum et al., 1997). The discrepancy in 
findings may be because the adaptations to the TSST-C reduced the stressful component 
of the tasks. The story and mathematics tasks were shorter than suggested in the original 
TSST-C and video-equipment was not used. It is of great importance, however, that 
VAS ratings suggest that most children did find the task stressful compared to the 
control group. It is ethically questionable whether it would have been acceptable to have 
exposed participants to the tasks for longer or to have heightened their anxiety with 
technological equipment. It is consistent with other research that significant correlations 
were not found between VAS ratings and salivary cortisol levels (e.g. Buske- 
Kirschbaum et al., 2003). The VAS ratings may suggest that the participants did have 
physiological stress responses, but that the measurement of this was limited.
It is possible that the latency of the cortisol release was longer than twenty minutes and 
therefore not observed. Other research has suggested that twenty minutes is reflective of 
peak cortisol after a stressor, however it is possible that by using only two time points of
106cortisol measurement important information about the individual’s stress reactivity was 
missed. Analysis of cortisol at, for example, five time points would have allowed 
cortisol change to be assessed in much greater detail. Further still, additional time points 
would have allowed down regulation of cortisol to be measured. It has been argued that 
both HPA reactivity and regulation are important for assessing individual differences in 
stress physiology (Ramsey & Lewis, 2003). There are of course many other ways to 
measure stress reactivity, for example a-amylase in saliva, heart rate monitoring or 
blood cortisol levels. Using more than one method would have been advantageous and 
may have enabled the detection of group differences in stress physiology.
An additional reason that may account for the lack of increased cortisol in the stressed 
group is that blunted cortisol responses have been found in some groups of children, 
including those with atopic disease (Buske-Kirschbaum et al., 2003). It is a limitation 
that this was not controlled for within this study as it is known that one in ten children 
have asthma in the UK (Asthma UK, 2007) and prevalence can be even higher in lower 
socio-economic groups. It is possible that this could account for the lack of increase.
It should also be noted that other research has not found increases in cortisol levels after 
psychological stressors with typically developing children (e.g. Luby et al., 2003; 
Femald & Grantham-McGregor, 1998). In addition, Skosnik et al. (2000) did not find a 
salivary cortisol difference between conditions in a within subject design with adults.
A related issue is whether all of the ToM tasks were carried out under the umbrella of a 
stress response. The children’s ratings of subjective stress levelled off possibly before
107both of the ToM tasks were completed.  A group difference remained at VAS time 3, 
when the second saliva sample was taken. However, by time 4 (at the end of the last 
task) the groups both rated similar, very low levels of stress. It is likely that in many 
cases, ToM tasks completed last in the series of presentation were not under the 
umbrella of feeling subjectively stressed; without physiological evidence it is difficult to 
feel confident that stress featured at all when these tasks were completed.
In terms of the ToM tasks used, the research may be limited by the sensitivity of the 
measures in detecting differences in mentalizing performance. The ToM tasks were 
selected for their advantages over other currently available measures. However, the tasks 
can be criticised as it is unclear what skills are required for each task, for example as 
well as mentalizing skills, the Strange Stories task clearly requires good comprehension 
skills. Additionally, other skills such as working memory, language, IQ and visual 
processing may be used and it is possible that these skills are differentially affected by 
stress.
It is of great interest that within the stressed group salivary cortisol was correlated with 
ToM performance on the Strange Stories (SS) task, although not the Eyes Test. When 
baseline cortisol, SAT scores, SS-Physical Control (SS-PC) and hour of day were 
controlled for, higher cortisol levels after the adapted TSST-C were associated with 
poorer performance on the SS-ToM task. Interestingly, the straight correlation between 
salivary cortisol and SS-ToM was strengthened when performance on the SS-PC stories 
was controlled for in a partial correlation. This correlation may be a better representation 
of the relationship between cortisol and the mentalizing aspect of the SS-ToM task.When SS-PC is controlled for, the unique relationship between ToM and salivary 
cortisol levels can be seen as the ‘noise’ variance from the performance aspect of the 
task is removed. This was to be expected as the SS-PC condition was included to control 
for task performance for the SS-ToM stories. The results suggest that the individual 
differences in ToM performance are associated with individual responses to the stressor 
as ToM performance was only correlated to the post-TSST-C cortisol and not the 
baseline measure. At first glance, this appears inconsistent with the finding that there 
was not an increase in mean cortisol in the stressed group. However, this may be 
explained by individual differences in stress reactivity; even though the overall group 
mean did not increase, some children’s cortisol did increase and other’s decreased.
In the absence of a group effect, the contribution of individual differences in ToM and 
stress related ToM performance cannot be clearly differentiated. In other words, the 
correlation may represent a relationship between cortisol and ToM performance 
independent of stress induction. Furthermore, the direction of the correlational 
relationship cannot be assumed; it is possible that children who found the tasks 
challenging had a resulting increase in cortisol. However, this is unlikely as previous 
research has indicated a lag time of 20 minutes for the physiological response to stress to 
be expressed in salivary cortisol, indicating that the cortisol collected at this time 
represents stress reactivity at the end of the TSST-C. A plausible explanation is that 
children who are better at ToM have less physiological reactivity to social stress. 
Alternatively, the result may suggest that raised levels of cortisol impair ToM 
performance. This interpretation is consistent with findings from other research that 
cortisol levels affect cognitive performance. Indeed, Skosnik et al. (2000) found thatadults with higher concentrations of salivary cortisol twenty minutes after mild 
psychological stress induction had greater reductions in attentional inhibition. The 
association between cortisol and ToM is consistent with the knowledge that preffontal 
cortex (PFC) function is affected by stress. Taking the PFC ‘offline’ at times of stress 
may have evolved for survival purposes, but it has been argued elsewhere that this is 
maladaptive in human society when PFC functions, such as working memory, 
behavioural inhibition and concentration are imperative (Amsten & Goldman-Rakic, 
1998). The results of the current finding may suggest that aspects of ToM could be 
added to this list. The finding is also consistent with theories about mentalization which 
suggest that stress affects ToM.
It should be noted that the association found is inconsistent with the study by Blair et al. 
(2005) which did not find an association between salivary cortisol levels and false belief 
performance. However, this may be because the study differed in terms of age of 
participants, stress induction procedure and ToM tasks. Additionally, the finding is not 
consistent with the idea that moderate increases in stress improve cognitive performance 
and only very large increases impair performance. Indeed, one interpretation of the lack 
of group difference in cortisol levels is that physiological responses to stress were not 
induced in the children in the stressed group. This interpretation would suggest that 
cortisol levels were not raised sufficiently to impair ToM performance in any of the 
children. It is possible, therefore, that the result is due to a type 1  error.
Of interest, a relationship was not found between cortisol and the Eyes Test. This may 
suggest that the relationship found between cortisol and SS-ToM was spurious.
110However, an alternative explanation is that the SS and the Eyes Test measure different 
aspects of mentalizing and that stress differentially affects these aspects. It should be 
noted that the two ToM tasks were significantly correlated, suggesting that they measure 
related concepts, but this has not always been found (e.g. Brent, Rios, Happe &
Charman, 2004). The Eyes Test was not correlated with the SS-PC stories and this may 
suggest that the correlation between the Eyes Test and SS-ToM is due to factors specific 
to mentalizing. However, the mentalizing demands of the SS-ToM and Eyes Test seem 
to be quite different; the SS-ToM measures social-cognitive aspects and the Eyes Test 
measures affective aspects. Evidence from fMRI studies on ToM and empathy suggests 
that whilst they rely on common networks for making inferences about mental states, 
ToM does not recruit networks involved in emotional processing (Vollm et al., 2006). 
However, Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) found activation of the amygdala during the Eyes 
Test and there is face validity that this task would involve emotional processing. Whilst 
stress can impair the PFC, the amygdala is not impaired and is in fact highly important at 
times of stress. This may be able to account for the discrepancy.
It was also hypothesised that internalising and externalising behaviours would be 
associated with ToM performance and that ToM would mediate a relationship between 
stress physiology and problem scores. However, significant correlations were not found 
between cortisol levels after the stressor, ToM performance and problem scores. A trend 
was suggested between baseline salivary cortisol and internalising and externalising 
problems, however correlations were not significant. Perhaps surprisingly, both trends 
indicated that lower cortisol levels were associated with higher scores on the problem 
scales. Other research has found this for externalising problems (e.g. Gunnar &
111Vasquez, 2001), but this was not expected for internalising problems, which are 
typically associated with higher baseline cortisol levels (e.g. Luby et al., 2003). Research 
investigating the relationships between ToM and behaviour difficulties has found 
inconsistent results and so the current findings in relation to emotional and behavioural 
difficulties are not unusual. Associations between problem behaviour scores and ToM 
ability have been found in other community settings (e.g. Hughes et al., 1998; Hughes & 
Ensor, 2006) and in fact, Badenes, Estevan & Bacete (2000) found that total scores for a 
set of Strange Stories correlated negatively with aggressive and socially withdrawn 
behaviour. However, other research (e.g. Cassidy, Werner, Rourke & Zubemis, 2003; 
Sutton, Reeves & Keogh, 2000) has not found these associations. However, there are a 
number of limitations of the current study that may explain why associations were not 
found. Firstly, a community sample was used and very few participants scored in the 
borderline or clinical range for problem scores. Secondly, the experimental ToM tasks 
may not be able to capture the difficulties that children with emotional and behavioural 
difficulties have with everyday ToM. Thirdly, potential relationships between ToM and 
CBCL scores in a community sample may have small effect sizes; with a sample of 383  
it is more than likely that the statistical tests did not have enough power to detect 
differences. Finally, the measurement of behaviour difficulties was limited: the CBCL 
was completed only by parents and the design would have been improved upon with 
teacher ratings and/ or observation.
3  Number in stressed group with completed CBCLs
112Clinical Implications and Future Research
In light of the limitations, the results need to be interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, it is 
worth considering further the association found between salivary cortisol and 
performance on the SS-ToM task. This may be the first experimental design to find 
evidence that cortisol levels are associated with ToM performance, linking stress to 
mentalization. The result may suggest that superior ToM ability is associated with lower 
stress reactivity or that aspects of mentalizing are very sensitive to changes in stress 
physiology.
The consequences of stress affecting, and indeed impeding aspects of ToM are 
universal, but may be extremely negative for some individuals. Clearly, there are many 
clinical implications. One example is the work carried out with families with high levels 
of stress. ‘Cycles of non-mentalizing interactions’ are theorised to occur (Fearon et al., 
2006 pp. 208) in which stress impairs mentalization and lack of mentalization in social 
interactions causes stress. Short Term Mentalization and Relational Therapy (SMART; 
Fearon et al., 2006) is designed to target these cycles. In light of the implications, a 
much greater understanding of how stress can affect ToM is needed.
Further research is required with larger sample sizes, different stress induction 
procedures and with more naturalistic ToM tasks. One suggestion is the design of virtual 
reality tasks measuring ToM, in which the participant is required to make ToM decisions 
in a social context. This has advantages for measuring ToM, but may also be a better 
way to assess the effects of stress on ToM. It is possible that stress linked more directly 
to the ToM task is more influential on the social-cognitive processes required, and this
113could be set up using virtual reality. In addition, a within subjects design may have 
added advantages in answering the research questions. There is theoretical and empirical 
research that suggests that stress and ToM are associated with emotional and 
behavioural difficulties and this should continue to be investigated. Again, future 
research would benefit from larger sample sizes and in addition, greater ranges of 
problem scores or greater severity of problem scores; indeed, a similar research protocol 
with a clinical sample of children would be extremely interesting.
Summary
The study did not detect group differences in ToM performance, but this may be due to a 
number of limitations. Crucially, a group difference in salivary cortisol levels was not 
found after the TSST-C/ control condition. However, an association between salivary 
cortisol post-TSST-C and SS-ToM performance was found and one interpretation is that 
some evidence has been gained linking stress to mentalization. Associations between 
ToM and emotional and behavioural difficulties were not found and ToM performance 
did not mediate a relationship between stress and emotional and behavioural difficulties. 
Due to limitations, the results should be interpreted with caution and further research is 
warranted looking at the effects of stress on ToM, and the relationship of this to 
emotional and behavioural difficulties.
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124PART 3
CRITICAL APPRAISALOverview
The critical appraisal is divided into three parts. Firstly, the research implications of the 
current study are discussed and the limitations explored, including issues related to 
measurement and stress induction. Secondly, the clinical implications of stress affecting 
ToM performance are discussed and links are made with current clinical practice. This 
will be followed by a personal reflection of the research process, including the 
challenges and successes, with reference to the literature review, planning the research 
project, working in schools, working with ‘stress’, carrying out a joint project and my 
personal development. The appraisal ends with a summary of the research.
126Research Implications
The current study did not find a group difference in ToM performance between those 
exposed to an adapted version of the TSST-C and controls. However, unexpectedly, a 
group difference in salivary cortisol levels was not found either. Nevertheless, some 
evidence was gained which may suggest a link between stress and mentalization; an 
association was found between post-TSST-C salivary cortisol and ToM performance on 
the Strange Stories task. The findings clearly warrant further research. The following 
section discusses the limitations of the current study and the difficulties intrinsic to 
research like this. It will outline the process of designing the research with consideration 
to stress induction in children, physiological stress measurement and ToM measurement.
Stress induction
Stress induction procedures, especially with children, are potentially contentious and 
require ethical deliberation. Many studies looking at the effects of cortisol on cognition 
have been with animals or within pharmacological studies with adults. Typically, in 
these experiments, high levels of physiological arousal can be induced, but there are 
obviously larger constraints in research involving the psychological stress of humans. 
Psychological stress procedures were developed for use with adults (e.g. Kirschbaum et 
al., 1993), with the advantage that these induce a natural variation of the stress response. 
These tasks have since been developed for use with children (e.g. TSST-C, Buske- 
Kirschbaum et al., 1997). Only a few studies have been carried out with children using 
this procedure, and to my knowledge, none have been carried out using a comparable 
control condition.
127Planning a stress induction procedure for children required the balancing of ethical 
issues, acceptability of the task to teachers, parents and children, and creating a stress 
response that could be measured. Adaptations to the TSST-C included decreasing the 
length of time the children spent doing the stressful tasks and in addition, only one adult 
witnessed the story and no video camera was used. The reasoning behind reducing the 
length of time was twofold. Firstly, during informal piloting of the procedure (with 
fellow trainees) the suggested amount of time for each task seemed very long and this 
was particularly pertinent for the control condition, in which the tasks were completed as 
thinking tasks. We were conscious that the controls should not feel stressed and we did 
not want this solitary time to feel punitive, irritating or boring. In addition to this, it was 
important to keep the total testing time to an hour and this was exceeded with the 
inclusion of the full length of the TSST-C. We considered the initial testing sessions 
with children as a pilot phase and those in the stressed group did report feeling stressed 
after the adapted TSST-C. In addition, this seemed like the maximum amount of time 
that those in the control condition could tolerate without getting bored. A further 
adaptation we made to the stress test was the inclusion of an anticipatory stressor 
(reminding the children that they would need to do more story telling or mathematics at 
the end of the procedure) as HPA activation has been shown to correlate with 
anticipatory stress appraisal (Gaab, Rohleder, Nater & Ehlert, 2005). This was included 
to maintain physiological arousal during the time that the ToM tasks were completed. It 
is unclear what effect this had on the children. It is acknowledged that our adaptations to 
the procedure may have resulted in the test not producing the same effects as the original 
TSST-C.
128Most children rated their stress levels as considerably higher after the TSST-C and 
visible signs of stress, such as fidgeting and worried looks were often observed. During 
debriefing at the end of the testing sessions, children were often relieved to hear that the 
TSST-C part of the procedure was supposed to be particularly hard and that they had 
done well at these challenging tasks. Some children expressed relief that they did not 
have to do more mathematics or story telling at the end of the procedure. It therefore 
appeared that the stress test did have its desired effects and a more stressful procedure 
may have been unethical. It should be noted that some other studies which have used 
psychosocial stress induction protocols have also not found an increase in cortisol levels 
after stress induction in typically developing children (e.g. Luby et al., 2003; Femald & 
Grantham-McGregor, 1998).
In terms of my subjective appraisal of how stressed the children appeared, two things 
which were noticed may be of importance. Firstly, many children seemed stressed 
immediately after the TSST-C and at the beginning of the first task, but then seemed to 
recover quickly. It often seemed that the children relaxed after starting the ToM or EF 
tasks. Some children appeared to find these tasks boring and this may have affected 
cortisol levels. In terms of subjective stress, it seemed that the design of the experiment 
would benefit from fewer or just one task to complete immediately after the TSST-C. 
However, in terms of salivary cortisol being at its peak it could be argued that in order to 
associate salivary cortisol with task performance, the tasks should be completed 20 
minutes after the end of the stressor. During testing, tasks were started between 1  and 25 
minutes (approximately) after the end of the TSST-C and were counterbalanced for 
presentation order. Presentation order was not found to affect task performance, but it isunclear how much performance was affected by concurrent stress, either as measured by 
subjective scales or salivary cortisol. Analysis at this level would not have been 
meaningful due to the small number in each group. However, it would be interesting for 
future research to explore this.
The second observation was the differential response towards the TSST-C task from the 
children. The TSST-C was very stressful for some children, but others seemed to enjoy 
it and enjoyed the challenge of it. For example one child said ‘I love mental arithmetic’, 
whereas other children looked extremely worried at the prospect. Indeed, after being 
reminded that there would be more mathematics at the end of the tasks, one boy said 
categorically, ‘I don’t want to do any more maths at the end.’ An advantage of the 
TSST-C was the inclusion of both story telling and mathematics; children tended to find 
one or other of these more challenging. This supports the use of the TSST-C or other 
stress induction procedures in which more than one type of challenging task is included.
In comparing the groups’ salivary cortisol, it is difficult to ascertain if the stressed 
condition was not stressful, or if the control condition was stressful or if there was a 
mixture of both. It is possible that some of the children did find the control condition 
stressful, possibly because they were working with an unfamiliar adult and possibly, by 
the nature of the task, the children may not have felt certain how they were doing (when 
answers were kept to themselves) or what was coming next. Alternatively, the children 
may not have been stressed, but bored by the tasks and lagging in concentration by the 
time they completed the ToM tasks.
130I have considered that if I designed the protocol again, it may be beneficial to create a 
more structured and more relaxing control condition. For example giving the children a 
completely different task that they would enjoy, attempting to avoid stress or boredom. 
Additionally, there would be advantages to using a within-subjects design, so that all 
children complete ToM tasks under stressful and control conditions. The main advantage 
being that the two groups would be identical and pairwise comparisons could be made 
looking at an individual’s performance in both conditions.
Measuring stress
Financial restrictions influenced the choice of measurement of physiological stress and 
furthermore, it was only possible to measure and determine cortisol concentrations in 
saliva at two time points for each child. This was disadvantageous as it would have been 
better to track cortisol up regulation and down regulation (see Ramsey & Lewis, 2003). 
Cortisol changes are often difficult to interpret and especially when only two time points 
are used. Measuring and tracking stress physiology is also enhanced if multi-methods 
are employed, for example blood plasma cortisol and heart rate monitoring. Procedures 
for measuring this physiology are advancing continuously and there has recently been 
much interest in using salivary alpha-amylase as a marker of stress. IBL Hamburg 
suggest that measuring this alongside salivary cortisol is an optimal way of looking at 
individual differences in stress physiology (IBL Hamburg, 2006).
Measuring ToM
The ToM tasks were selected because they are considered advanced tests of ToM and 
have been successfully used with similar age groups before (e.g. Brent et al, 2004). They
131are advantageous over more classical second order false belief tasks because a range of 
scores is obtained and individual differences in performance can be analysed. The 
Strange Stories are argued to measure the understanding of internal mental states; the 
social cognitive aspect of mentalizing. The Eyes Test involves emotion recognition, 
measuring affective aspects of mentalizing and is argued to be free of general 
intelligence skills (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). There are specific criticisms of the two 
tasks and more general criticisms about experimental ToM tasks.
As well as ToM ability, the Strange Stories require good comprehension skills. Indeed, it 
was observed that the Strange Stories felt very difficult for many of the children 
primarily because the stories are relatively long and complicated; some of the language 
was hard for some of the children to understand. In an adaptation from the original, the 
stories were read and left in view of the children in order to reduce memory loading (as 
in Brent et al., 2004), but it still seemed difficult for some children to recall all the 
details when producing their answers. The Eyes Test can be criticised as it only requires 
the representation of an agent’s attitude (e.g. he’s angry about something), but it does 
not require any content of the attitude (e.g. he’s angry about the letter). Jarrold, Butler, 
Cottington & Jimenez (2000) argue that without the representation of both attitude and 
content, it is not a proper representation of how another represents the world and hence 
is not metarepresentation. ToM requires inferring the content of a belief and not just that 
they believe something (Jarrold, Butler, Cottington & Jimenez, 2000).
It remains debatable how generalisable performance on these tasks is to ToM use in 
everyday interactions. The use of ToM is likely to be affected by many factors,
132including the relationship context of the interaction, motivation (e.g. competition), 
empathy and social moralisation. Arguably, experimental tasks of ToM may be 
interpreted as the participant’s ToM ability when tested explicitly, but they may not tell 
us the full story about everyday abilities. Natural use of ToM can be described as fluid, 
whereas experimental tasks are concrete and inflexible and are more likely to assess 
crystallised ToM knowledge or competence. It is plausible that stress is more likely to 
affect the fluid nature of ToM. Therefore, it could be argued, that in order to assess the 
effects of stress on ToM, more naturalistic ToM tasks are needed and I have suggested 
the idea of using virtual reality or computer games to create these tasks.
Measuring language
It was not possible to complete formal measures of language ability. This would have 
required an additional meeting with each child which was not feasible. However, this 
limited my ability to control for language when analyzing the ToM tasks and I relied 
upon SAT scores which were gathered from teachers. Although this was not ideal, this 
measure did give a good indication of the child’s ability.
Intra-individual differences in ToM and the factors which influence these differences is 
a new and exciting line of research with many clinical implications. Stress is a likely 
candidate for affecting ToM ability in a given situation and the knowledge base about 
ToM ability and use would benefit greatly from further research using stress induction 
procedures. The limitations of the current study illustrate the difficulties intrinsic to this 
type of research and suggest many considerations for the planning of future research.
133Clinical Implications: Stress and ToM/ Mentalization
The implications of stress affecting ToM are universal. It is possibly a phenomenon that 
we are all aware of in our own lives. For example, in an emotionally charged argument it 
is often extremely difficult to see another person’s point of view. It is clear that some 
people are more easily aroused by stress and/ or may have lower thresholds for stress 
affecting their cognitive performance. In relating stress and ToM to emotional and 
behavioural difficulties, it seems plausible that many children and adults with these 
difficulties will be more prone to the effects of stress. Clinical observation of the effects 
of stress on ToM/ mentalization and theoretical accounts have prompted the 
development of interventions with these ideas at the foreground.
ToM/ mentalization based treatments have been developed recently, but it is arguable 
that mentalization ideas are not new per se, but a core component of all psychotherapies. 
For example Bjorgvinsson & Hart (2006) argue that Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
(CBT) overlaps with mentalization concepts and indeed enhances mentalization 
capacity. Bateman & Fonagy (2004) suggested that mentalization is a bridging concept 
between therapies, in a similar way to the therapeutic alliance.
In terms of the effects of stress on ToM, most therapies involve learning how to cope 
with high level emotions, for example fear and anger. It also seems true that many 
therapies use a metaphorical ‘pause button’ (Allen, 2005) for reflection of these 
moments of high arousal (e.g. CBT: Bjorgvinsson & Hart, 2006; Dialectical Behaviour 
Therapy: Lewis, 2006). For example, in CBT, the therapist may ask the client to stop 
and think: ‘What went through your mind before that happened?’ Arguably, reflecting
134on events in this way allows the person to mentalize explicitly and to reflect upon the 
consequences of their implicit mentalization at the time of arousal (Bjorgvinsson & Hart, 
2006).
Specific mentalization based treatments have developed primarily in response to 
working with difficult-to-treat patients. They often incorporate psycho-education about 
explicit and implicit mentalization, encouraging the client to learn to stop, pause and 
then mentalize explicitly. Lewis (2006) explains to clients during skills training, the 
‘narrowing of thinking’ associated with the fight or flight response to aversive situations, 
at the expense of mentalization. She illustrates this with situations when this is clearly 
adaptive, for example when faced with extreme threat, and times when this is less 
adaptive, for example in interpersonal situations which are clearly best resolved by 
mentalizing. Clients can be taught to identify the early stages of physiological arousal to 
avoid the ‘mentalizing paradox’ (Tobias, Haslam-Hopwood, Allen, Stein & Bleiberg, 
2006); in the midst of physiological arousal one must be able to reflect that they have 
stopped mentalizing before making a conscious decision to mentalize. Other techniques 
are then taught, for example self-soothing techniques to enhance emotional regulation at 
these times. Another strand of treatment may be in helping clients to increase their stress 
tolerance, pushing the boundaries of the zone in which they are able to mentalize 
(Tobias et al., 2006).
Mentalization based treatments with families, for example, Short Term Mentalization 
and Relational Therapy (SMART; Fearon et al., 2006) also puts a great deal of emphasis 
on the effects of stress on mentalization.  In families with high levels of stress, ‘cycles of
135non-mentalizing interactions’ are often established, during which stress frequently 
impedes ToM (Fearon et al. 2006 pp. 208). In these cycles, strong emotions result in 
non-mentalizing responses to others which are unhelpful and unsupportive. Controlling 
behaviour is used as a ‘second-line’ strategy replacing the use of psychological means to 
influence others behaviours. Interactions are therefore hostile, coercive, undermining, 
frustrating, distressing and ultimately stressful which triggers non-mentalizing in others. 
A long term consequence of this may be that these interactions become predictable and 
possibly over-learned so much so that non-mentalizing occurs without the emotion to 
initiate it (Fearon et al. 2006).
The implications clearly suggest that further research is warranted in investigating the 
effects of stress on ToM and how this is associated with clinical problems in both 
children and adults.
Persona] reflection 
The Literature Review
It has been rewarding to research a topic in so much detail and I have enjoyed learning 
about the impact of individual differences in ToM. This helped me to situate the 
empirical research within a wider context and I have reflected upon the importance of 
research findings to date and future research. The potential implications of research 
within this field, have served to motivate me during the project when at times the task of 
completing it has been daunting. It has however been challenging at times to remember 
the wider context when submerged in trying to evaluate details. I have had to hone my
136skills at broadening out and relating what I was learning at any given time to the overall 
picture.
Planning the research project
In planning the project, I was greatly aware of tensions between designing a protocol 
which would answer the research question, ethics and recruiting participants. These 
tensions were within the context of carrying out a joint project and working within 
primary schools. We needed to design a feasible experiment which schools, parents and 
children would consent to taking part in. We considered that it would be appropriate to 
work with each child on one occasion for a maximum of one hour and that questionnaire 
packs sent to parents should be as brief as possible. This influenced the choice of 
measures selected and the way in which we adapted the TSST-C.
Working in schools
Working within primary schools presented many challenges and these will be discussed, 
including recruiting participants and working with factors not within the researchers’ 
control.
A strength of the study is that the children in the sample came from different ethnic 
backgrounds. Of the 65 children who returned forms, 63% were from black or ethnic 
minorities. Six of the schools we worked in were in Islington, a London borough in 
which 64% of primary school pupils are from black and ethnic minority backgrounds 
(CEA@Islington, 2005). In terms of ethnicity the sample therefore appears, at least at a
137surface level, to be representative of Year 5 pupils in other schools in Islington and 
similar boroughs.
On commencing the project, I anticipated that recruitment could be difficult for two 
reasons. Firstly, we were going to ask the children to do something challenging/ stressful 
and secondly because we were asking for saliva samples. It is difficult to know how 
much these factors did influence parents’ and children’s willingness to take part, but one 
head-teacher did not agree to the school taking part in the study due to these very 
reasons. Two further obstacles to getting schools to take part were that London primary 
schools are inundated with requests from people wanting to carry out research and, more 
generally, the schools are very busy.
Although most children appeared interested in the experiment, only 20% of children that 
we gave presentations to actually took part. This may be due to a number of reasons: the 
ethical reasons stated above, the parents did not receive or read the letters, the parents 
could not speak English, the children did not want to take part. A methodological 
constraint on participation was that none of the information, questionnaires or measures 
were translated into other languages and therefore a pre-requirement was that children 
and parents needed to speak and read English. In addition to this, another factor was 
parent’s willingness for their children to take part and/ or their willingness to fill in the 
questionnaire packs. The questionnaire pack was estimated to take about thirty minutes. 
(It included a demographic questionnaire, the CBCL and two measures for the other part 
of the joint project). It would be interesting to know more about the differences between 
children who took part, and those who did not. It is of interest that more girlsparticipated in the study than boys. Due to the small percentage of children from each 
school taking part, a larger number of schools than anticipated were required in order to 
recruit enough participants. This posed many challenges in organisation and a large 
amount of liaison with school representatives was essential.
It was important that we fitted into the school system and that we worked collaboratively 
with the teachers in terms of setting up when and where we could work with the 
children. The rooms we used varied in distractions and it is unclear if this could have 
influenced the stress induction procedure or the children’s concentration during ToM 
tasks. Our desire to control for factors affecting cortisol levels was paramount to the 
design, but compromises (e.g. starting times of the procedure) had to be made in order to 
work in different schools. It may be that other variables were influencing the children’s 
cortisol levels and reactivity. For example, children taking part in the 1  O’Clock slot 
typically came straight from playing in the play ground. Some of the children would 
have been exercising and some would not have. Although attempts were made to make 
sure these children had early lunches, this was not always possible. In addition, we were 
not always able to control how much prior warning children were given about taking 
part in the experimental procedure and this may have affected anticipatory anxiety in 
some of the children and not others. The influence of this anticipation or the immediate 
effects of being asked to work with a stranger may have differentially affected cortisol 
levels. Some children were excited and looking forward to the session and other children 
were nervous. Whilst these individual differences may be of interest, it may have also 
have been due to being the first or last child in the class to take part or the result of 
hearing from other children about the experimental procedure. An important
139consideration is that atopic diseases were not controlled for. Atopic diseases, including 
asthma have been shown to be associated with blunted cortisol reactivity and in addition, 
medications used to control asthma also affect cortisol levels.
Working with stress
During the process of planning, carrying out and writing up the piece of research, I have 
become increasingly familiar with the complications in measuring stress reactivity. It 
was somewhat disappointing that we did not influence a group difference in salivary 
cortisol after the TSST-C, but as a control group has not been used alongside a group 
exposed to the TSST-C, it is difficult to interpret if this was a failing of the stress 
induction procedure. Measuring only salivary cortisol and only at two time points can be 
criticized greatly and it is very likely that we missed out on a wealth of information 
about individual differences in stress reactivity. However, research of this type is 
expensive and, perhaps, does not lend itself well to a research project of this size. 
Complications arose from carrying out data collection in the school setting, whereby 
many factors that could potentially influence cortisol levels were difficult to control for 
(see above). Nevertheless, I think it has been of great benefit to include a physiological 
measure and making links between the experience of a stressful situation and task 
performance to underlying physiology has been very exciting. An enjoyable part of the 
research was locating a laboratory to carry out the cortisol analysis and making contact 
and connections with IBL Hamburg, Germany.
The ethical issue of stressing children was ever present in my mind. The protocol was 
designed so that it was not hugely different from the challenging tasks that children are
140often expected to complete in the classroom. However, it was in contrast to my role as a 
clinician to induce negative affect in the children and at times felt uncomfortable. I did 
feel, however, that debriefing the children at the end of the testing session worked 
extremely well in relieving any residual negative feelings about the TSST-C tasks. The 
children were pleased to hear that the tasks were meant to be hard and that they did well 
just to have a go at them.
Joint project
Carrying out a joint project with a fellow trainee has been extremely rewarding and 
enjoyable, however it also posed many challenges. Choosing research questions that lent 
themselves to being answered through a common experimental design ensured that we 
had the resources to analyze salivary cortisol as well as measuring subjective stress. This 
was a major advantage for the research project. Other advantages were in sharing ideas 
to design a joint protocol and sharing the difficulties that were encountered during 
recruitment. At times it was also a challenge to work jointly. In particular, coordinating 
our time was occasionally difficult and naturally we needed to compromise on some 
ideas. It also felt difficult not to have control over the project, especially within the 
context of balancing other demands of the training course. However, working through 
these challenges has in itself been rewarding and I feel I have learnt more about how I 
work and how I work with others. It is my understanding that Clinical Psychologists 
typically carry out research in conjunction with others and I have reflected that this has 
been an extremely valuable learning experience.
141Personal development
I have had an academic and clinical interest in ToM for many years, since I first learnt 
about the concept during my undergraduate degree and simultaneously began some 
voluntary work with children with autism. However, whilst researching for this thesis I 
have been struck by the huge importance of this social ability and its interaction with so 
many clinical problems. I have become acutely aware of this within my own clinical 
work and in other learning opportunities. For example, in my current clinical work with 
children with severe mental health problems, I have often encountered the idea that 
some of the children and their families have rigidity in their communication and 
difficulty in expressing their thoughts and feelings. Indeed, it is often commented upon 
by other professionals that a goal of therapeutic work should be to enhance the family 
members’ mentalization skills. A common feature of psychotherapy is to create an 
interpersonal context where the understanding of mental states becomes a focus 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). I have become increasingly aware of dialogue about mental 
states within my clinical work and I believe that this has enhanced my clinical skills.
Summary
This thesis has outlined the literature on individual differences in ToM in relation to 
emotional and behavioural difficulties. Although, this type of research is in its infancy 
there is evidence to suggest that individual differences in ToM are associated with 
difficulties in childhood. There may be many factors, however, which influence an 
individual’s use of ToM other than their explicit abilities. The empirical study 
investigated the influence of stress on the performance of 9 -  10 year old children on 
two ToM tasks. It was also hypothesized that ToM performance may mediate arelationship between stress physiology and emotional and behavioural difficulties. A 
group difference in ToM performance between those exposed to the stressor and those in 
a control condition was not found. However, these groups did not differ in salivary 
cortisol levels either. Nevertheless, an association was found between a measure of 
salivary cortisol twenty minutes after the stressor and performance on one of the ToM 
tasks. Links to a measure of emotional and behavioural difficulties were not found. One 
interpretation of the results may suggest that higher salivary cortisol levels were 
associated with poorer performance on the ToM task. This is consistent with the idea 
that stress can impair ToM. Bearing in mind the limitations of the study, further research 
in this area is warranted.
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146Appendix A: Individual contribution to the joint project
The empirical research was carried out as part of a joint project with James Fairbaim 
(‘Stress, cortisol and executive functioning in pre-adolescent school children’).
All written work has been planned and completed individually, including the research 
proposal, the literature review, the empirical paper and the critical appraisal. Reviewing 
current literature for these purposes has been carried out independently. The majority of 
the data analysis was carried out independently (initial examination of the cortisol 
variables was carried out together). The measures unique to this part of the project were 
selected and, after administration, scored independently.
The experimental protocol was developed jointly. This included discussions, research 
and joint working, whereby an equal share of work was completed by both trainees. 
Information sheets, consent forms and the transcript of the procedure were written 
together. Joint applications were made to the UCL Ethics Board and for research funds; 
the preparation of these was shared equally. The recruitment of participants was carried 
out jointly and equally. Both trainees contacted schools and liaised with head-teachers, 
teachers and other staff members. Both trainees gave short presentations to classes of 
children and both were actively involved in giving out and collecting in forms and 
questionnaire packs. Carrying out the experimental procedure with the children was 
shared; each trainee worked with approximately half the total number of participants. 
This included carrying out tasks with each child for each other’s research project. 
Liaison and the practicalities of sending the saliva samples for analysis were shared. 
Data entry of common variables was shared.UCL GRADUATE SCHOOL
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Dr Pasco Fearon and Dr Steven Butler 
Sub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology 
UCL
Gower Street 
London
24 January 2006
Dear Dr Fearon and Dr Butler
Re: Notification of Ethical Approval 
Re: Ethics Application: Social stress: effects on theory of mind and executive function in chitdren
Further to the meeting of the UCL Research Ethics Committee on Thursday 19 January, I am pleased to inform 
you that the above research has been given ethical approval for the duration of the project.
Dr    lay member of the Committee,  who reviewed the application,  would relish the opportunity of 
accompanying the researchers to one of the designated primary schools in London to act as an observer.  I do 
hope that this will be possible and I would be grateful if you could liaise with the Secretary of the Committee,  Ms 
, to discuss this matter further on tel:  .
Approval is subject to the following conditions:
1.  You must seek Chair’s approval for proposed amendments to the research for which this approval has been 
given.  Ethical  approval  is  specific to this  project  and  must  not  be  treated  as  applicable to  research  of a 
similar  nature.  Each  research  project  is  reviewed  separately  and  if there  are  significant  changes  to  the 
research protocol you should seek confirmation of continued ethical approval by completing the ‘Amendment 
Approval Request Form’.
The form identified above can be accessed by logging on to the ethics website homepage: 
http://www.grad.ucl.ac.uk/ethics/ and clicking on the button marked ‘Key Responsibilities of the Researcher 
Following Approval’.
2.  It is your responsibility to report to the Committee any unanticipated problems or adverse events involving 
risks to participants or others.  Both non-serious and serious adverse events must be reported.
Reporting Non-Serious Adverse Events.
For non-serious adverse events you will need to inform Ms  ,  Ethics Committee Administrator 
 within ten days of an adverse incident occurring and provide a full written report that 
should  include  any  amendments  to  the  participant  information  sheet  and  study  protocol.  The  Chair or 
Vice-Chair of the Ethics Committee will confirm that the incident is non-serious and report to the Committee 
at the next meeting.  The final view of the Committee will be communicated to you.
Reporting Serious Adverse Events
The  Ethics  Committee  should  be  notified  of  all  serious  adverse  events  via  the  Ethics  Committee 
Administrator immediately the incident occurs.  Where the adverse incident is unexpected and serious, theLetter to Dr Fearon and Dr Butler 24/1/2006
Chair  or  Vice-Chair  will  decide  whether  the  study  should  be  terminated  pending  the  opinion  of  an 
independent expert.  The adverse event will be considered at the next Committee meeting and a decision 
will be made on the need to change the information leaflet and/or study protocol.
On  completion  of  the  research  you  must  submit  a  brief  report  (a  maximum  of  two  sides  of  A4)  of  your 
findings/concluding  comments  to  the  Committee,  which  includes  in  particular  issues  relating  to  the  ethical 
implications of the research.
Yours sincerely
Chair of the UCL Research Ethics Committee
Cc: James Fairbaim & Lucy Partridge, Sub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology, UCL
149Appendix C: Letters and consent forms
Sub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology
UNIVERSITY  COLLEGE  LONDON
COWER STREET  LONDON  WC1E 6BT
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PUPILS
Dear Pupil,
After our talk today we wanted to give you some more information about our project to 
take home and think about.
•   Why is this research happening?
The study is about how children in Year 5 understand other people's feelings and actions, 
and their ability to concentrate when doing a computer task. We're looking at what makes 
these tasks easier or harder.  We are especially interested in how these sorts of tasks can 
be more difficult when you are under a  little bit of pressure or when the task is  more 
challenging.
•   Why have I  been chosen?
You have been chosen because you are in Year 5 and all the children in your class have been 
invited to take part.  We need about 60 children in your school and other schools to take 
part.
•   What will I  have to do?
There will  be two groups of children and there is an equal chance you will be group  1 or 
group 2. We would like all the children to tell a short story and do some mental arithmetic 
for a few minutes. In one group these tasks will be more difficult. We would also like you to 
answer some questions about characters in some stories and pictures, and to do a task on a 
computer. There are no right or wrong answers.
We will also ask you to spit a small amount of saliva into a little pot so that we can send it 
off to a laboratory. At the laboratory they will look to see how much of a hormone called 
'cortisol' is in it, which tells us how your body responds to challenges. Once we have got this 
measurement we will not keep the samples you give us (they will be destroyed).
Everyone taking part has the chance of winning tickets for their family to go to the cinema.
•  Oo I  have to take part?
It's up to you!  If you decide you don't want to we will not mind.  You do not have to take 
part if you do not want to.
UCL
150•   Will information I  give be kept private?
Yes. Each person will have a number so that your name will not be written on any of the 
questionnaires, answer sheets or on your saliva sample. We will carefully lock everything 
away and password protect any information on a computer.
•  What do I  do now?
Talk to your parent/guardian and if you decide that you want to be involved you need them 
to complete the consent sheet.  If you and your parent/ guardian would  like you to take 
part, please return all the forms to the school office. If you have any questions please let 
your teacher know.
Thank you for your help!
James and Lucy
151Sub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology
UNIVERSITY  COLLEGE  LONDON
SOWER STREET  LONDON  WC1E6BT
(To be completed by the child)
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
1. Have you read the information sheet?
Yes  No
2. Have you had the chance to ask questions about the project and did you 
understand the answers to any questions?
Yes  No
3. Do you think that you have been told enough about this project?
Yes  No
4. Did you know that you can decide to not  take part in this project at any time?
You  don't need  to tell me why and this won't make a difference to things in
school.
Yes  No
5. Do you want to take part in the project?
Yes  No
Name___________________________________
Signature_______________________________
Today's Date________________  Date of birth
Name of researcher_________________________
UCL
Signature of researcher DateSub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE  LONDON
GOWER STREET  LONDON  WC1E6BT
INFORMATION SHEET
Dear Parents/Guardians,
Our  names  are  James  Fairbaim  and  Lucy  Partridge.  We  are  Trainee  Clinical 
Psychologists and are carrying out a study conducted by University College London and 
your child’s school.  We are writing to invite you and your child to take part in this 
study.  The study is looking at factors involved in the development of behavioural and 
emotional difficulties in children and aims to help professionals to help children with 
these difficulties.
•  What is the purpose of the research ?
Many things affect children’s chance of developing behavioural and emotional 
problems, one important factor is how children perform under pressure. We are hoping 
to find out more about the link between performance under pressure and children’s 
emotional and behavioural difficulties. We are particularly interested in how children are 
able to think flexibly, avoid distraction and think about other people’s thoughts and 
feelings, when are faced with a mildly challenging task (like some of those which 
children experience within the classroom environment). The results of the study will 
help us understand young people’s social understanding, concentration and behaviour 
better, and may help us to develop strategies to prevent behavioural and emotional 
problems in children.
•  Why has my child been chosen ?
This school has been chosen because it takes both boys and girls and we have asked 
your child to be involved only because of their age, not because of anything to do with 
their behaviour. All children of your child’s age within the school are being asked to 
participate. We hope to collect information from around sixty families who will have a 
wide range of opinions, all of which will be useful to the research.
•  What will my son /  daughter have to do if they take part?
The children taking part will be randomly allocated into two different groups.  In one 
group the children will be asked to carry out some challenging tasks in which they may 
feel they are being evaluated,  such as giving a short speech and doing  some mental 
arithmetic.  In the second group, the children will complete less challenging tasks and 
will not feel evaluated. None of the tasks in either group will be more demanding than 
those regularly carried out within the school environment. Children in both groups will 
then be asked to complete questions about characters in some stories and pictures, and 
carry out a 10 minute computer task, involving tapping a button in response to changing
153pictures and positions. Most children enjoy tasks like these. The children will also be 
asked to give some samples of their saliva (by spitting in a pot) to measure the way their 
body responds to the tasks. These samples will be analysed to determine the amount of 
cortisol in them. Your child’s teacher will also be asked to give some information on 
your child’s language comprehension. The things that we would like to do would take 
about  one  hour  in  total,  and  would  be  carried  out  during  the  school  day  with  the 
agreement of your child’s teacher.  Everyone taking part will be entered into a raffle, 
where they have the chance of winning a family trip to the cinema.
•  Will I need to do anything if I agree that my child can take part?
Parents or guardians are asked to sign the attached consent form and return it to the class 
teacher. We will then send you some questionnaires, which should take about 30 
minutes to complete and should also be returned to the class teacher. The questionnaires 
ask for brief background information about you, and about your child’s feelings and 
behaviour as well as your opinions on being a parent.
•  Is the research confidential?
Yes. All information collected will be used for research purposes only and an ID number 
used to  keep answers  confidential.  Teachers will not see the forms the children and 
parents complete. Your child will also not see the answers you provide regarding their 
behaviour. The saliva collected from your child will be anonymous and only identifiable 
by a number. Once it has been analysed it will be destroyed.
•  Are there any risks from taking part?
There is no reason to believe that taking part in this study would be harmful in any way. 
Your child will be asked to take part in a mildly stressful activity which is similar in 
many respects to the sorts of challenges that children face at school quite regularly (e.g. 
reading aloud, doing tests). However we will monitor children’s feelings carefully, and 
if we thought they were finding the tasks unduly stressful, the session would be ceased 
immediately.  All  proposals  for  research  with  people  are  reviewed  by  an  ethics 
committee  before  they  can  begin.  This  proposal  has  been  examined  by  the  UCL 
Committee on the Ethics of Non-NHS Human Research. If you do have any concerns, 
you are free to contact us at the address given below.
•  Who should I contact If I have any questions?
Please contact James Fairbaim or Lucy Partridge if there is anything that is not clear or 
if you would like more information.
•  Do we have to take part?
You and your child do not have to take place in this study if you do not wish to. You, or 
your child, may withdraw at any time without having to give a reason.  Your child’s 
decision to take part or not, will not affect their schooling or teaching in any way.
•  If you do choose to take part....
Thank you very much, for your help. Please sign the consent form and return it to the 
school, together with your child’s consent form.
154Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet.
Yours sincerely
James Fairbaim and Lucy Partridge 
Trainee Clinical Psychologists 
(address and contact details given)
Please note: The researchers have undergone a criminal records check.
Clinical Psychology Investigation of Factors Affecting Behaviour in Children
If, once you have read the information sheet, you would like your son/daughter to be involved 
in the research please complete this slip. If you do decide that you would like your child to 
take part in the study you can always change your mind and withdraw him/her from the study 
without giving a reason. This will not affect your child’s schooling in any way.
Please complete this slip and return it to your child’s class teacher.
I have read the information sheet and agree to my child taking part in this study.
Child’s Name...............................................................
Child’d Date of Birth...................................................
Parent’s Name in capital letters................. ..........................................
Parent’s Signature.....................................................
Date...............................
155Appendix D: Transcript of the Procedure (verbal instructions)
Prior to testing, class teachers will be given a list of the children we will be testing on 
each day, so they can fore-wam the child in the morning before their testing session. 
Check children have had an early lunch. First child starting at 1pm.
In class room, both children (stress/non stress) will be picked up by the experimenter 
carrying out the “non-stressed” condition
Hello are you ready? We’re going to   to do the games and activities for our
study, you’ll be back in about an hour. Before we go, can you have a sip of water.
First room should contain; Blank and lined paper, pens and pencils, lap-top, 2 chairs, 
desk and tasks. Once in first room, experimenter who is carrying out the “non- stressed” 
condition should say to both children.
Thanks for returning all the forms. Today we wanted to do some games and activities 
with you, as part of the study which we spoke to you and your class about As part of 
our study I ’ll ask you to spit some saliva into a little pot so that we can measure 
something in it called cortisol, which changes depending on how you are feeling.
We are seeing lots of children in your class and some from other schools the same age 
as you. Some of the tasks will be easy, but some you might  find harder. Do you still 
want to carry on? Just to let you know, if  you do want to stop at any time, then that is 
fine, just teU me, I won ’t mind at all, and you can stop. Also, if  you have any 
questions, I can answer them all at the end. Is that Ok?
©  First saliva sample collection, carried out by both experimenters 
To start off with, I ’d like you to spit some saliva into this pot, using this straw, try and 
make the pot half  full Thank you.
First visual scale by both experimenters (take children to areas where can’t see each 
others choice on scale)
This is a scale representing how you are feeling. If this is feeling very happy (point to 
picture 5), this is ok (point to picture 3) and this is very worried or stressed (point to 
picture 1), can you point to the scale to show me how you are feeling now?
Thank you for doing that, we’re now going to split up and James/Lucy is going to take
X  to th e  room and we’re going to stay here.  You’ll see each other back in class in
about an hour.
Stress condition
Throughout stress test, give adequate positive feedback, either facial or verbal.
Ok, firstly I ’m going to tell you the beginning of a story, listen carefully because I ’m 
going to ask you to make up the ending. I ’m going to ask you to stand up and tell me
156out loud your ending to the story.  You need to listen carefully as I want you to make 
your story really good.
Yesterday my bestfriend Robert and I went home from school, suddenly we had the 
idea to visit Mr Gregg who lived in the big old house located in the dark forest near 
our town. Mr Gregg was a crazy old man and our parents didn 7 like the idea that we 
sometimes went visiting him. There was a rumour in town that there was a mystery 
about the old house.  When we arrived at the house, we were surprised that the door 
was open. Suddenly we heard a strange noise, and cautiously we entered the dark 
hall........
What do you think happens next? I want you to make it up. Vm going to give you 2 
minutes to prepare your story. Then I will ask you to stand up and tell me your story. 
Try and make it as exciting as possible, see if  you can make it better than all of the 
other children’s.
Experimenter sits behind the desk and holds clip board, watching child prepare story for 
2 minutes.
If child asks you to repeat the story say
Try and remember the best you can, it doesn’t matter if  you can 7 remember all 
of the story I read you, but I want you to make up what may happen next
If child tries to make conversation with the experimenter (unless relating to 
distress/not wanting to continue), say....
It’s important  for the study that we don 7 talk through this bit, so please try to 
get on with the task quietly.
After 2 minutes of preparation
The 2 minutes is up, can you stand up and tell me the rest of  your story now. I would 
like you to keep telling the story for 3 minutes.
If the child finishes before 3 minutes, use following prompts, until child is not 
able to continue.
Can you tell me a bit more about that? And what else might happen?
Thank you for telling me your story. Don 7forget about your story, as I am going to 
ask you some more about it at the end.
Mental arithmetic task
Now we are going to do some mental arithmetic.  You’re going to do this for 3 minutes. 
I would like you to subtract/take away 7  from 758, then continue take away 7  from 
each answer. For example 758 take away 7 is 751, then you would take away 7  from 
751 and so on.... Try to do it as fast as you can and as accurately as possible. Off  you 
go...
(if  failing at any point ask to stop and start again at 758)
Continue for 3 minutes after starting.
157If child stops or finds very difficult...
Just keep going and do your best
Answers: 758, 751, 744, 737, 730, 723, 716, 709, 702, 695, 688, 681, 674, 667.
Thankyou
©  Second visual scale 
Have another look at this scale, can you show me how you are feeling at the moment 
using the scale again.
T asks
-> TAKE SECOND SALIVA SAMPLE AFTER 20 MINUTES
Stories
Nb counterbalancing -  read either physical or ToM stories first.
Read each story to child, record answers verbatim.
We’re going to look at some stories now. On each page you will  find a short story to 
read. After you’ve read and understood the story, there will be a question. I*d like you 
to tell me the answer to this question. I ’ll read through the story and question with 
you.
Show practice question and ask question 
Ok, lets carry on
As I said before, don *t  forget your story from the first task as I will be asking more 
about it at the end. I might also ask you to do some more maths at the end too.
— > Second saliva sample?
E v es
Show practice item
In this folder I ’ve got lots ofpictures ofpeople’s eyes. Each picture has four words 
round it I want you to look carefully at the picture and then chose the word that best 
describes what the person in the picture is thinking or  feeling. Let’s have a go with 
this one.
158Point to words as they are read. Make sure child picks one of the options and given 
encouraging feedback without revealing whether they are right are wrong.
Now look at this person. Do you think he is feeling jealous, scared, relaxed or hate?
Ok, leVs have a go at the rest of them. You mightfind some of them quite easy and 
some of them quite hard, so don *t worry if it*s not always easy to choose the best word. 
Fit read all the words for you so you don’t need to worry about that. If  you really can’t 
choose the best word, you can have a guess.
Proceed with the test items in exactly the same way as the practice item.
(Prompt)
If taking a long time prompt with: Which word do you think fits besft
As I said before, don't  forget your story as I will be asking more about it at the end. I 
might also ask you to do some more maths at the end too.
-» Second saliva sample?
A tten tion  N etw ork  T ask
Instructions given for computer task. Task takes approximately 17 minutes.
As I said before, don *t  forget your story as I will be asking more about it at the end. I 
might also ask you to do some more maths at the end too.
— >  Second saliva sample?
— > Second saliva sample 
20 minutes after stress test.
I would like you to spit some more saliva into this pot
©  Third visual scale: Immediately after second saliva sample 
Can you please tell me how you are feeling at the moment using the scale again.
End of testing
©  Fourth visual scale: Immediately after last task.
Can you please tell me how you are feeling at the moment using the scale again.
Can you remember the story you made up at the beginning? Is there anything else you 
would like to add to it?
159I ’m not going to ask you any more questions about it and I don ’t need to ask you any 
more maths questions.
You’ve done all the tasks that I wanted you to do and you’ve done really well I know 
some of them were quite hard, but you did really well
Give child one example of something they did well.
Shall we do something  fun before you go back to class? Lets play a game of 
hangman!
©  Final visual scale 
Can you tell me how you are feeling again, using the scale?
Thank you for all your hard work today, I am very impressed. When we have finished 
seeing everyone in your class, we will come back and tell your whole class more about 
why we have asked you to do these games and activities today. You will be able to ask 
any questions then, but I was wondering if  you had any questions you would like to 
ask me now?
Great, let’s go back to class.
Control condition
I ’m going to tell you the beginning of a story, listen carefully because I ’d like you to 
make up an ending to the story. I ’m not going to ask you tell me your story, but I ’d 
just like you to have a think about it
Yesterday my bestfriend Robert and I went home  from school, suddenly we had the 
idea to visit Mr Gregg who lived in the big old house located in the dark forest near 
our town. Mr Gregg was a crazy old man and our parents didn’t like the idea that we 
sometimes went visiting him. There was a rumour in town that there was a mystery 
about the old house.  When we arrived at the house, we were surprised that the door 
was open. Suddenly we heard a strange noise, and cautiously we entered the dark 
hall........
What do you think happens next? I ’m going to give you for 2 minutes to prepare your 
ending to the story. It can be as exciting as you like. The story is for you to keep to 
yourself, you won ’t have to tell it to anyone. I ’d  just like you to think about it  Whilst 
you’re doing that, I ’ll sit here and do some reading.
Experimenter stays in room, but does not pay attention to child, gets on with “own 
work”.
If child asks what the point is say
160It’s just a thinking task/a task for you to do some thinking
If child asks you to repeat story say
Try and remember the best you can, it doesn *t matter if  you can ’t remember all 
of the story I read you, but think to yourself about what may happen next 
Remember, you won 9 t have to tell anyone.
If child tries to start conversation (unless related to distress/ wanting to stop), 
say.....
Try and keep going through this bit without talking, as it is important  for the 
study. Think of other things to add into your story. Maybe you could think of 
other people who could be in the story.
After 2 minutes
That’s 2 minutes up. Like I said, you don’t need to tell me your story, but I ’d like you 
to either write some of  your story down or draw a picture of something in your story. 
I ’m not going to ask to see your writing or drawing, the exercise is just  for you to do 
some thinking.
Give 3 minutes.
If child finishes before 3 minutes encourage them to continue.
Can you think of anything else you would want to write/draw about the story?
Mental arithmetic task
Now I would like you to do some arithmetic.  It’s just going to be in your head-you 
don’t need to tell me the answers. You ’re going to do this for 3 minutes, I would like 
you to take away 7  from 758, then continue taking away 7  from each answer. For 
example 758 take away is 751, then you would take away 7from 751 and so on,,,. Off 
you go,,,
(time 3 minutes)
How did you find that? It’s quite difficult isn *t it,
©  Second visual scale 
Have another look at this scale, can you show me how you are feeling at the moment 
using the scale again.
Great, are you feeling ok to carry on?
T asks 
T asks w ere adm inistered the sam e as in the stress condition. N o  
rem inders about further story or m aths tasks w ere g iv en  b etw een  
tasks as in the stress condition.
-> Second saliva sample 
20 minutes after stress test.
I would like you to spit some more saliva into this pot
161©  Third visual scale: Immediately after second saliva sample 
Can you please tell me how you are feeling at the moment using the scale again.
End of testing
©  Fourth visual scale: Immediately after last task.
Can you please tell me how you are feeling at the moment using the scale again.
You’ve done all the tasks that I wanted you to do and you’ve done really well I know 
some of them were quite hard, but you did really well
Give child one example of something they did well.
Shall we do something fun before you go back to class? Lets play a game of 
hangman!
©  Final visual scale 
Can you tell me how you are feeling again, using the scale?
Thank you for all your hard work today, I am very impressed.  When we have finished 
seeing everyone in your class, we will come back and tell your whole class more about 
why we have asked you to do these games and activities today,  You will be able to ask 
any questions then, but I was wondering if  you had any questions you would like to 
ask me now?
Great, let’s go back to class.
162Appendix E: The Strange Stories (Happe, 1994): The Stories, Scoring and 
Examples of Answers
Strange Stories Task Instructions
Providing context-appropriate mental state explanations for story characters’ non­
literal utterances
Participants  are  read  a  number  of stories  and  have  to  answer a  simple justification 
question about each story. Eight of the stories involve mentalizing and participants have 
to answer the question correctly using mental state terms. Five of the stories are controls 
and do not require any mentalizing to answer them correctly.
There are 2 conditions in this task:
8 = Theory of mind -  stories to do with mental states 
5 = Control (physical) -  stories to do with physical behaviour
The stories
Practice Story: On Christmas Eve Alice’s mother takes her to the big department store in 
town.  They go to look in the toy department.  In the toy department Mr. Brown, Alice’s 
next-door neighbour, is dressed up as Santa Claus, giving out sweets to all the children. 
Alice thinks she recognises Mr. Brown, so she runs up to him and asks, “Who are you?” 
Mr. Brown answers, “I’m Santa Claus!”
Q:  Why does he say this?
11. Two enemy armies have been at war for a very long time.  Each army has won 
several battles, but now either side could win.  The two sides are equally strong. 
However, the Blue army is stronger than the Yellow army in foot soldiers and tanks.
But the Yellow army is stronger than the Blue Army in aeroplanes.  On the day of the 
final battle there is heavy fog over the mountains where the fighting is about to begin. 
Low clouds hang above the soldiers.  By the end of the day the Blue army has won.
Q:  Why did the Blue army win?
12. A burglar is about to break into a jewellery shop.  He skillfully  picks the lock on the 
shop door.  Carefully he crawls under the electronic detector beam.  If he breaks this
163beam it will set off the alarm.  Quietly he opens the door of the store-room and sees the 
gems glittering.  As he reaches out, however, he steps on something soft.  He hears a 
screech  and  something  small  and  furry  runs  out  past  him,  towards  the  shop  door. 
Immediately the alarm sounds.
Q:  Why did the alarm go off?
13. Mrs.  Simpson works in a library. One day she receives a special book and has to 
decide  where  to  put  in the  library.  The  library  is  very  big,  and has  many  different 
sections.  The new book is about plants and their medical uses, and has lots of drawings 
in it.  However, Mrs. Simpson does not put it with the books on plants.  She does not put 
it with the books on medicine either.  Instead, she carefully takes it into a separate room. 
In this room all the books are kept in special cases, and the temperature is kept constant.
Q:  Why did she do this?
14. Old Mrs. Robinson is very frail.  One day she slips on her icy door step and falls on 
her side.  She gets up right away, although she feels quite bruised and shaken.  The next 
day her leg feels very stiff and she can hardly walk.  She makes her way to the doctors. 
As  soon as the  doctor hears  about the  fall,  and  sees her swollen side, he  says,  "Go 
immediately to casualty".  At the casualty department they take an X-ray.
Q:  Why did they take an X-ray?
15. John is going shopping.  He buys a nice new desk lamp, for his study.  He needs a 
light bulb for his new lamp.  He goes from the furniture shop to the electrical shop.  In 
the electrical  shop he finds that there are two brands of light bulb of the right kind. 
Everbrite light bulbs cost less in single packs than Literite bulbs.  However, only Literite 
bulbs come in multi-packs of six.  John buys the multi-pack, even though he only needs 
one bulb.
Q:  Why does John buy the Literite bulbs?
16421. Simon is a big liar.  Simon's brother Jim knows this, he knows that Simon never tells 
the truth!  Now yesterday Simon stole Jim's ping-pong bat, and Jim knows Simon has 
hidden it somewhere, though he can't find it.  He's very cross.  So he finds Simon and he 
says, "Where is my ping-pong bat?  You must have hidden it either in the cupboard or 
under your bed, because I've looked everywhere else.  Where is it, in the cupboard or 
under your bed?"  Simon tells him the bat is under his bed. Jim goes straight to the 
cupboard.
Q:  Why will Jim look in the cupboard for the bat?
22. During the war, the Red army captures a member of the Blue army.  They want him 
to tell them where his army's tanks are; they know they are either by the sea or in the 
mountains.  They know that the prisoner will not want to tell them, he will want to save 
his army, and so he will certainly lie to them.  The prisoner is very brave and very 
clever, he will not let them find his tanks.  The tanks are really in the mountains.  Now 
when the other side ask him where his tanks are, he says, "They are in the mountains".
Q:  Why did the prisoner say that?
23. Brian is always hungry.  Today at school it is his favorite meal - sausages and beans. 
He is a very greedy boy, and he would like to have more sausages than anybody else, 
even though his mother will have made him a lovely meal when he gets home!  But 
everyone is allowed two sausages and no more.  When it is Brian's turn to be served, he 
says, "Oh, please can I have four sausages, because I won't be having any dinner when I 
get home!"
Q:  Why does Brian say this?
24. Jill wanted to buy a kitten, so she went to see Mrs. Smith, who had lots of kittens she 
didn't want.  Now Mrs. Smith loved the kittens, and she wouldn't do anything to harm 
them, though she couldn't keep them all herself.  When Jill visited she wasn't sure she 
wanted one of Mrs.  Smith's kittens,  since they were all males and she had wanted a 
female.  But Mrs. Smith said, "If no one buys the kittens I'll just have to drown them!"
165Q:  Why did Mrs. Smith say that?
25. One day Aunt Jane came to visit Peter.  Now Peter loves his aunt very much, but 
today she is wearing a new hat; a new hat which Peter thinks is very ugly indeed.  Peter 
thinks his aunt looks silly in it, and much nicer in her old hat.  But when Aunt Jane asks 
Peter, "How do you like my new hat?", Peter says, "Oh, its very nice".
Q:  Why does he say that?
26. Helen waited all year for Christmas, because she knew at Christmas she could ask 
her parents for a rabbit.  Helen wanted a rabbit more than anything in the world.  At last 
Christmas Day arrived, and Helen ran to unwrap the big box her parents had given her. 
She felt sure it would contain a little rabbit in a cage.  But when she opened it, with all 
the  family  standing  round,  she  found  her  present  was  just  a  boring  old  set  of 
encyclopedias, which Helen did not want at all!  Still, when Helen's parents asked her 
how she liked her Christmas present, she said, "It's lovely, thank you.  It's just what I 
wanted".
Q:  Why did she say this?
27. Late one night old Mrs. Peabody is walking home.  She doesn't like walking home 
alone in the dark because she is always afraid that someone will attack her and rob her. 
She really is a very nervous person!  Suddenly, out of the shadows comes a man.  He 
wants  to  ask  Mrs.  Peabody  what  time  it  is,  so  he  walks  towards  her.  When  Mrs. 
Peabody sees the man coming towards her,  she starts to tremble and says,  "Take my 
purse, just don't hurt me please!"
Q:  Why did she say that?
28. A burglar who has just robbed a shop is making his getaway.  As he is running 
home, a policeman on his beat sees him drop his glove.  He doesn't know the man is a
166burglar, he just wants to tell him he dropped his glove.  But when the policeman shouts 
out to the burglar, "Hey, you!  Stop!", the burglar turns round, sees the policeman and 
gives himself up.  He puts his hands up and admits that he did the break-in at the local 
shop.
Q:  Why did the burglar do that?
Scoring:
Answers are scored as follows (see below for examples):
•  2 = full and explicitly correct  answer
•  1  = partial or implicit answer
•  0 = incorrect or don’t know
Examples:
pi. Armies  ‘Why did the blue army win?’
2 = ref to both weather conditions and relative ground superiority, inability of other 
army's planes to be useful in fog (names of armies unimportant)
1  = ref either to weather OR to relative superiority on ground vs air.
0 = ref to irrelevant or incorrect info (e.g. they won cos they had better planes)
p2. Burglar  “Why did the alarm go off?
2 = ref to animal, which the burglar disturbed, setting off the alarm (n.b. type of animal 
unimportant, e.g. cat, mouse, rat all okay).
1  = ref to burglar setting off alarm, e.g. being startled by animal and so crossing the 
beam.
0 = ref to irrelevant or incorrect facts (e.g. the animal’s screech set off the alarm). 
p3. Librarian  ‘Why did she do this?
2 = ref of delicate condition of book due to age, value and may ref temp control on room
1  = general ref to special status of book, not further explained (e.g. to keep it safe)
0 = ref to other motivations not warranted by story (e.g. so she would always know 
where to find it. For her own convenience).
p4. Leg  “Why did they take an X-ray?”
2 = ref to possibility that she has fractured/broken her hip/leg (e.g. they want to see if 
she has broken anything).
1  = ref to general aim (e.g. to see what’s wrong. Because of her fall).
0 = ref to irrelevant or incorrect factors (e.g. that’s what doctor’s do).
p5. Lightbulbs  ‘Why does John buy the literite bulbs?’
2 = ref to saving money (since multipacks are cheaper). NB may also, but needn't 
mention convenience of having more, or future need of more bulbs.
1671  = ref to convenience of having more, or future need for more than one bulb (e.g. so 
wont have to keep going to the store) No mention of saving money.
0 = ref to irrelevant or incorrect facts (e.g. he likes the literite the best. He needs a whole 
lot of bulbs.
ml. Brothers  "Why will Jim look in the cupboard for the bat?’
2 = ref to Simon having lied, being a liar, Jim knowing Simon lies etc.
1  = ref to facts without explicit mention of lying - e.g. That's where it is really
0 = ref to general, story non-specific info e.g. things are usually left 
in cupboards.
m2. Armies  “Why  did the prisoner say that?”
2 = ref to fact that other army will not believe and hence look in other place, to 
prisoner’s realisation that that’s what they’ll do, or ref to double bluff.
1  = ref to outcome -  to save the armies tanks, or simply lying (to mislead them, to lie)
0 = ref to motivation that misses the point of double bluff (e.g. because he was scared 
and wanted to tell the truth).
m3. Sausages  “Why  does Brian say this?”
2 = ref to intention to mislead, persuasion, making them feel sorry for him.
1  = ref to outcome (to get more), simply trait (greedy), or simple desire (wants more 
sausages).
0 = ref to irrelevant facts (e.g. because his mum will have made him a lovely meal).
m4. Kittens  “Why did Mrs. Smith say that?”
2 = ref to persuasion, manipulating feelings, trying to induce pity/guilt, etc
1  = ref to outcome (to sell them).
0 = ref to general knowledge or dilemma without realisation that statement was not true 
(e.g. she couldn’t keep all of them. It’s kinder to kill them. She’s a horrible woman, she 
hates cats).
m5. Hat  ‘Why did she say that?’
2 = ref to white lie or wanting to spare his aunt's feelings
1  = more general ref to trait (he's a nice boy) or relationship (he likes his aunt)
0 = ref to irrelevant or incorrect fact/feelings (e.g. he likes the hat. He wants to trick her)
m6. Rabbit  ‘Why did she say this?’
2 = ref to white lie or wanting to spare her parents feelings
1  = more general ref to trait (e.g. she's nice) or emotion (she things it's better than no 
present at all)
0 = ref to irrelevant or incorrect fact/feelings (she likes the books. She's a hypocrite!) 
m7. Mrs Peabody  ‘Why did she say that?’
1682 = ref to her belief that he was going to mug her, or her ignorance of his real intention
1  = ref to her trait (she's a nervous person) or state (she's scared), or intention (so he 
wouldn't hurt her) without suggestion that fear was unnecessary.
0 = factually incorrect/irrelevant answers (e.g. he would like to kill her if she didn't give 
the purse)
m8. Burglar  “Why did the burglar do that?”
2 = ref to burglar’s ignorance of policeman’s true intention/knowledge state (e.g. he 
didn’t know the policeman just wanted to return his glove. He thought the policeman 
had seen him rob the shop).
1  = more general ref to burglar’s state of mind (e.g. he had a guilty conscience) or 
outcome (He thought the police might shoot otherwise).
0 = ref to irrelevant facts/mental states (he just wanted to come clean. He was tired of 
running. The police had his glove).
169Appendix F: The Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, 2001): An Example 
1.  Female
Correct answer = sure about something
surprised  sure about something
170Appendix G: Visual Analogue Scale
1   2 
Very calm 
and relaxed
•  «
u
8  9  10
Very stressed and 
not at all relaxed
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